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ABSTRACT 
 
The soft budget constraint problem arises in most transition and developing 
countries during their decentralization process. Indeed, central governments 
generally transfer responsibilities to lower levels of governments but maintain 
strong interests in local affairs. The result of such a setting is sub-national 
governments’ expectation to receive additional funds in case of financial crisis. 
This thesis provides an overview of the literature on this topic, in dealing 
respectively with facts, models and empirical works. The first part describes the 
origins of the soft budget constraint in transition and developing countries, as 
reported in the case study literature. It also illustrates mechanisms to harden sub-
national budget constraints. The second part aims to display fundamental models 
developed to explain the bailout phenomenon. Goodspeed (2002) and Wildasin 
(1997) effectively model interactions between levels of government in a given 
situation to demonstrate bailout’s expectation and its implication. Moreover, 
related models and recent additional developments complete this technical view of 
the topic. Finally, the last part introduces empirical studies on the problem in 
transition and developing countries. Investigations demonstrate worrying results, 
since authors find evidence of soft budget constraint in their analyses.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralization underlies new setup with many positive aspects for lower levels 
of government, especially in the field of responsibility and autonomy. For a 
country, as for a firm or other organization, autonomy for a sub-national 
government raises the potential for opportunistic behaviour, possibly with 
desirable as well as undesirable effects. Recent studies assesses that 
decentralization process results in high costs, especially at early stages of 
development and in countries in transition to a market economy (Rodden, 
Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 2-3).  
 
This paper addresses a problematic feature that transition and developing 
countries face during the decentralization process, namely the soft budget 
constraint problem. Generally, central authorities rapidly transfer responsibilities 
to lower levels of government. Thus, the central government has limited control 
over sub-national government spending and borrowing, but it maintains strong 
interest in the affairs of lower-level governments. The result of such a setting is 
that sub-national governments perceive that they will receive additional resources 
in the event of financial crisis. The term soft budget constraint defines the 
expectation of receiving additional resources from the central government 
(Vigneault, 2003, p. 1). The concept was originally formulated by Kornai to 
describe the bailout of losses in socialist state-owned enterprises. The notion was 
further used to illustrate the rescue of indebted or insolvent authorities by central 
government (Kornai, 2003, p. 1096-1097). There is currently no consensus about 
the definition of soft budget constraint problem, however most authors agree that 
“the syndrome is truly at work only if organizations can expect to be rescued from 
trouble, and those expectations in turn affect their behaviour” (Kornai, 2003, p. 
1104). Wildasin argues that the sub-national outcome that occurs under soft 
budget constraint would not have been attainable under the “normal”, “initial” or 
“announced” constraint. This author describes the bailout as “receivership” in 
order to give “the flavour of this phenomenon” (Wildasin, 1997, p. 5-6).  
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The implicit guarantee that the central government will rescue a sub-national 
government that faces financial problems leads to a potential source of distortion, 
namely the common pool problem. “A sub-national government does not perceive 
the full social cost of national tax resources used for bailing it out”, that is, sub-
national government does not “take into account the true social marginal cost of 
taxation and choose an excessive level of expenditure” (Pisauro, 2001, p. 9). 
Indeed, sub-national government may generate an excess of deficits as well as an 
excess of public spending without thinking about the additional cost to national 
taxpayers. A second source of distortion is listed in the literature under the term of 
moral hazard problem. The implicit insurance of bailout by the central 
government leads sub-national governments “to decide not to raise the revenue 
required to finance their expenditure – even though they have enough fiscal 
autonomy to do that – since they may believe they have the option of being bailed 
out by the central government and then financing local expenditures with national 
revenues” (Pisauro, 2001, p. 5).  
 
The purpose of this paper aims to provide a synthesis of the soft budget constraint 
problem in transition and developing countries. The first part sets outs facts of the 
case studies literature. Indeed, the first chapter describes five common origins of 
soft budget constraint. The second attempts to list mechanisms implemented by 
central government in order to harden sub-national budget constraints. Examples 
illustrate each section of this factual presentation. The second part shows how 
authors model soft budget constraint origins. In fact, chapters three and four study 
methods to precisely examine bailouts and their implications in the economic 
world. The fifth chapter gives an overview of models related to bailouts and 
commitment problems. For instance, a new wave of bailout models bears a 
relation to tax competition. The last part introduces empirical surveys on the soft 
budget constraint problem in transition and developing countries. Authors have 
studied about the influence of soft budget constraint’s determinants in specific 
countries. Most of the studies use data from Latin American federations, as these 
examples illustrate interesting fundamentals or economic characteristics.  
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I. FACTS AND DESCRIPTION 
 
The first part of this paper aims to expose a complete description of the soft 
budget constraint problem in transition and developing countries as reported in the 
case study literature. The first chapter examines five key determinants of soft 
budget constraint. The content of the second chapter corresponds to the 
mechanisms to harden sub-national budget constraint. Examples illustrate each 
section and a synthesis will summarize the kind of problems case study countries 
face.  
 
1. Origins of the soft budget constraint problem 
 
The first chapter of this thesis tries to explore the soft budget constraint problem 
in compiling different issues of case studies. The major goal is to set out an 
analytical framework in order to explore the origin of the mechanism in transition 
and developing countries. Through analyses of former Soviet Union nations, Latin 
American and Asian countries, one may identify similar difficulties in 
maintaining hard budget constraints. The sections below present five types of 
problems that often occur in those countries, namely vertical fiscal imbalance, 
intergovernmental finance and hierarchical relations, political mechanisms, 
borrowing and finally the size of sub-national government.  
 
1.1 Vertical fiscal imbalance 
 
The decentralization process in transition and developing countries is fraught with 
difficulties, as mentioned in the introduction. A common feature is the devolution 
of expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments without the adequate 
taxing authority, which accrues to the central government. This leads to a vertical 
fiscal imbalance that necessitates intergovernmental transfers. This grant 
programme alters the perception of local voters, governments and creditors about 
the real levels of expenditure that can be sustained. Furthermore, highly transfer 
dependant sub-national governments have limited flexibility to raise additional 
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revenue in case of unexpected adverse fiscal shocks. The choices which often 
occur include cutting services, running deficits or relying on arrears to employees 
and contractors and therefore the risk to incur a fiscal crisis. The transfer 
dependence allows local politicians, along with their voters and creditors, to 
believe that the central government is ultimately responsible for the deficits and 
that it cannot ignore the fiscal woes (Rodden, 2002, p. 672). The existence of 
large vertical fiscal imbalance1 creates expectations of bailout and central 
government comes under pressure from sub-national governments, voters and 
creditors. The simplest solution for the central government is consequently a 
bailout. One may add that larger vertical fiscal imbalance exacerbates the 
common pool problem. Indeed, sub-national governments have every incentive to 
overspend when a large share of financing is raised by the central government 
(Pisauro, 2001, p. 4).  
The little autonomy in tax revenue and the highly pro-cyclical feature of transfers 
justify the little sub-government’s flexibility to absorb macroeconomic shocks. 
One may determine that the vertical fiscal imbalance explains the large sub-
national amount of debt relating to the Tequila crisis in Argentina, Brazil or 
Mexico. For instance, Mexican states and municipalities main sources of revenue 
are composed of net block transfers, whereas the federal government collects most 
of the rich tax bases (Trillo, Cayeros, Gonzales, 2002, p. 370).  
 
1.2 Intergovernmental finance and hierarchical relations 
 
The following features of intergovernmental finance and hierarchical relations 
between levels of governments tend to promote soft budget constraint problem. 
Intergovernmental transfer systems become more complex and develop an 
interdependent network of different shared taxes, expenditure function and 
decision-making bodies which makes it impossible for voters and taxpayers to 
identify which level of government spends or taxes and for what purposes 
(Saiegh, Tommasi, 1999, p. 15). Indeed, unclear distribution of expenditure 
authority, constitutionally mandated services or uncertain transfers put sub-
                                                
1 Vertical fiscal imbalance may be assessed as « transfers as a percent of total sub-national 
revenues » (Rodden, 2002, p. 672). Larger are the transfers, greater is the vertical fiscal imbalance. 
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national governments and their citizen in a position where they have incentives to 
believe that the centre will back their overspending.  
 
1.2.1 Clarity of the distribution of expenditure and revenue authority 
This part respectively examines the lack of clarity in the distribution of 
expenditure and revenue authority. One notices that unclear or overlapped 
assignments between the centre and the sub-national governments blur the real 
responsible. The centre has therefore difficulties in maintaining a credible “no 
bailout” policy because local voters and politicians still expect discretionary 
transfers to back their debts.  
 
Distribution of expenditure authority 
Most of the case studies show that there is often a lack of clarity in the 
distribution of expenditures. The roles and responsibilities that different levels of 
government are expected to provide do not appear clearly in national 
Constitutions. In fact, responsibilities in providing certain services between 
central and sub-national governments are not divided into well-defined and 
mutually exclusive categories. Therefore local governments often have to provide 
the services and bear the costs. Finally, sub-national communities cope with 
additional expenditures without the equivalent funding. Unclear or shared 
responsibilities have a cost in term of accountability and incentives, and may 
therefore soften the budget constraint.  
The Ukrainian legal foundation of intergovernmental system demonstrates 
ambiguity about what each level of government is supposed to provide, as well as 
the functions that executive and legislative branches should face. Indeed, the 
Constitution emphasizes that sub-national governments “may be considered as 
local government bodies only when they represent and follow common interest of 
territorial communities in villages, town and cities. Otherwise they act as 
deconcentrated agents of the centre” (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 7). Moreover, 
provisions for decentralized governments are specified in a bundle of specific 
laws (for instance the Law on Local Self-Government), which exacerbate the 
existing ambiguity. In fact, the various relationships established in those laws are 
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peculiarly interwoven and create more confusion about “who is responsible for 
what”. We notice with this example that ambiguity in the Constitution or in 
different laws engender a vague idea on the real provider of services and, 
indirectly, which level of government bears the costs.  
Another type of uncertainty comes from the sharing of responsibilities for the 
provision of services. For example, the Brazilian or the new South African 
Constitutions list a variety of “joint” responsibilities of the federal and the states 
governments. This includes a wide range of spending such as health, education or 
welfare. Sometimes three levels of government are concerned by the provision 
which leads to confusion and chaos in the service delivery (Ahmad, 2003, p. 13). 
One can notice that the same problem arises in Hungary with the so-called 
“potential” responsibilities. Again, the lack of clarity about the provider of 
services generates potential source of commitment problem, and therefore softens 
the budget constraint.  
 
Distribution of revenue authority 
As in the case with the spending authority, overlap in the distribution of taxing 
authority leads to confusion and inefficiency (Rodden, 2003b, p. 7). Local 
governments rely on various sources of revenues, but often have little control over 
most of these. A first type of local revenue in transition and developing countries 
comes from shared taxes, which both rate and base of tax, as well as the rate of 
sharing is determined by the centre (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 11). The 
regulation of tax base or rate might engender uncertainty about the ultimate 
responsible for local fiscal outcomes. This limited autonomy lets local politicians, 
voters and creditors believe that the centre remains accountable in case of fiscal 
crisis and therefore backs the debts. A second main source of revenue is the 
intergovernmental transfers and represents the scope of the next section.  
 
1.2.2 Transfers  
In most transition and developing countries, central government raises important 
revenue and redistributes them to sub-national government as revenue sharing 
arrangements or transfers. The soft budget constraint may arise if transfers to sub-
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national governments are discretionary, that is, if transfers are based on poorly 
defined or easily manipulated criteria. Sub-national communities may petition the 
central government to use its discretionary transfer power in a period of financial 
crisis (Vigneault, 2003, p. 4). Indeed, transfer-dependence might give to sub-
national politicians and citizens an indication of the central responsibility in case 
of fiscal profligacy. There is a wide range of fiscal intergovernmental transfers 
throughout the world, with specificities depending on each country. Hereafter are 
presented three types of transfers which give to sub-national governments 
disincentives to harden their budget constraint.  
 
Negotiated transfers 
Countries give to their sub-national governments opportunities to negotiate the 
size of their annual grants. Despite a possible reliance on formula based transfers, 
bilateral negotiations introduce an element of non-transparency and lead to moral 
hazard problems (Mc Carten, 2003, p. 12). It happens that transfers based on ad 
hoc decisions and devoid of any formal criteria granted politically powerful or 
wealthy states. For instance in 1988, the home state of President Sarney in Brazil2 
received more money through negotiated transfer than all the other state 
governments in the northern region as a whole (Rodden, 2003b, p. 10) This 
eloquent example illustrates the distortion that may appear with negotiated 
intergovernmental transfers. Note that transfers done on arbitrary basis or political 
bargaining remain a common practice in transition and developing countries.  
 
Gap filling transfers 
This sort of transfer assists local governments that have deficits or go bankrupt 
and provides therefore incentives to raise less revenues and to increase 
expenditures since grants may potentially fill the gap (Wetzel, Papp, 2003, p. 20). 
Generally, transfer systems based on gap filling risk to engender behavioural 
changes from sub-national entities, which have less motivation to raise their own 
taxes. Indeed, an increase in local resources will then reduce the likelihood of 
receiving other transfers. For instance, the demand for the “deficit grants” system 
                                                
2 José Sarnay served as President of Brazil from March 1985 to March 1990.  
 - 13 - 
applying in Hungary, which possesses the characteristics described above, has 
increased during its two first years of existence. This phenomenon proves that 
sub-national governments expect a bailout rather than raising their own revenues.  
 
Equalization transfers 
Another type of transfer prompts sub-national government to adopt strategic 
behaviour. Fiscal equalization system, which aims toward the equivalence of 
living conditions or absorbs regional shocks, redistributes revenues from the 
wealthy to the poor sub-national communities. Based on concepts as financial 
resources and needs, this kind of transfer lessens the incentives to improve 
revenue collection for poor sub-national governments. Indeed, they receive grants 
to balance their budget, thus they have no reason to raise their own economic 
performance and tax base (Rodden, 2003a, p.12-13). For instance, The 
“Normative Grants” is such a disincentive transfer system in Hungary. Based on a 
series of norms, it aims to equalize culture, education and social welfare across 
the country (Wetzel, Papp, 2003, p. 12-13). Despite the use of this type of transfer 
in transition and developing countries, one of the most famous situations is 
happening in a developed country, namely Germany and the equalization system 
between its Länder.  
Transfers might introduce bad incentives and expectations that affect the 
behaviour of sub-national governments. The next section deals with a different 
issue related to the provision of a specific kind of goods or services.  
 
1.2.3 National regulations 
Sub-national governments are sometimes required to provide constitutionally 
mandated services or face significant externalities. National regulations, such as 
the provision of minimum services standards, undermine the autonomy of sub-
national jurisdictions. Identically, merit good, that consumers are unwilling to 
purchase at the right level because of their preferences, also justify the 
intervention of governments. National or sub-national governments act as players 
of the market and therefore fund goods or services in order to encourage or 
compel the consumption by citizens. Note that purely local public goods, with 
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non-excludable and non-rivalry characteristics, have the same implications, but 
are not necessarily mentioned in regulations. In certain countries, it also exists a 
number of laws regulating wages or social payment to the population under social 
assistance that define responsibilities and prices for local governments. Those 
regulations, as mandated services, clearly limit the decision making of sub-
national government and mitigate their expenditures commitment. The 
implication of the centre in local fiscal affairs, through national regulations, can 
send a signal to local politicians or voters that the central government is ultimately 
responsible for the fiscal outcomes. Hence a belief of bailout in critical situations 
such as the failure in the provision of key services that have national 
constituencies can occur. The centre might be unable to refuse bailout if sub-
national governments are failing in their responsibility to provide the services 
(Rodden, Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 15). In Ukraine, local governments provide 
mandatory services they are unable to finance even though they are required the 
Constitution. This leads to a large amount of arrears, particularly for wages and 
pensions (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p.11). In such situations, the central 
government will find difficulties to make credible promises not to provide bailout.  
 
1.3 Political mechanism 
 
Decentralization creates opportunity for voters to punish or reward their 
representatives for the fiscal annual results. Through the mechanisms of “voice” 
or “exit”, citizens may express their opinion on the effectiveness of the local 
government in carrying out its functions. Despite these positive elements of 
democracy, transition or developing countries still have problems in the well 
functioning of political mechanisms. Transparent information on governments’ 
budget or national political features may influence, or even worse, distort citizens’ 
choices. This section is divided into two parts, the first explaining the 
consequences of a lack of information and the second treating the importance of 
coalition and term of office.  
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1.3.1 Information 
Voters need information on government performance in order to assess annual 
results. Access to sub-national budget or council decisions are not sufficient to 
monitor local officials’ performance, data must be accurate and transparent. 
Citizens in presence of a lack of information cannot perceive who is responsible 
for their fiscal health and may have a perception that their local representatives 
are not held accountable for deficits (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 17-18). On the 
other hand, even with adequate information, sub-national budgets are complex 
and entail difficulties in the identification of true costs and benefits of government 
policies. Authors such as Alesina and Perotti assume that sub-national 
governments deliberately overestimate budgets, in order to create confusion and 
hold them less accountable for financial problems (Vigneault, 2003, p. 4). The 
result of such a distortion of information is the citizens’ exclusion from the 
decision process. This impossibility to monitor annual budgets therefore fosters 
distrust and scepticism towards local governments. Moreover, the usual overlap of 
expenditure responsibilities between levels of government tends to complicate this 
electoral accountability. In Brazil, as in Ukraine, voters have neither the 
information nor the incentives they need to effectively hold state governments 
accountable for their fiscal activities. In such a context, creditors are led to believe 
that debt is backed by the central government (Rodden, 2003b, p. 34).  
 
1.3.2 Coalition and term of office 
Fiscal discipline may be influenced by political mechanisms, even in respecting 
the rules of democracy. The features of a national political system, such as 
electoral or career incentives faced by public officials, might affect fiscal 
outcomes. Elected politicians and their respective parties influence the budget 
process and therefore the spending programme. Stability of coalitions or length of 
mandates might influence the expenditure and revenue decisions. The Indian case 
exposes this point of view because of relatively short mandates and short time 
horizon in office. Rather than competing for the support of the median voter, state 
politicians militate to solidify the support of their party and maintain a stable 
score at the polls. A former Indian Finance Secretary, S. Guhan, made strong 
 - 16 - 
remarks about this serious instability of governance. He particularly found that 
“state governments with a time-horizon of two to three years cannot be expected 
to have deep commitment to long-term development or even an involvement in 
medium-term issues during their uneasy and limited tenure” (Mc Carten, 2003, p. 
31). Typical consequences were the building of physical infrastructures or the 
investment in social policies without planning mechanisms for long-term cost 
recovery. This leads logically to a great fiscal indiscipline and increases the 
likelihood of bailouts. Still in relation with political mechanisms, election system 
may also influence fiscal outcomes. In countries with promotion, politicians move 
to a different level of government to aspire to higher status. Without re-election 
incentives, as in Brazil, the constant shifting of individuals makes electoral 
accountability difficult and therefore endangers the fiscal discipline. Moreover, a 
political system that runs without parties’ competition exacerbates this risk 
because career advancement depends on the provision of particularistic goods to 
specific groups of constituents (Rodden, 2003b, p. 18-19). For instance, the 
massive granting of politically powerful regions to gain votes before an election 
arises in certain transition and developing countries.  
 
The political mechanisms and their implications for accountability play a crucial 
role in the softness of budget constraint. An insufficiently mature system or ill-
intentioned executives might create large deficits that next generations will have 
to deal with. Weaker is the political stability, bigger the fiscal imprudence and the 
risk of excessive spending. This softness in the sub-national government’s 
behaviour, often coupled with a too little tax effort, open as a consequence a 
window called borrowing. This latter will be treated in the next section.  
 
1.4 Borrowing 
 
Most sub-national governments provide services that generally require sizeable 
investment and because those services provide a bulk of future benefits over a 
long period, it is appropriate to finance them through borrowing in order to spread 
the cost of the assets over time (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 25-26). In other 
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words, it is both fair and efficient for future generations to share the cost of 
financing projects (Trillo, Cayeros, Gonzales, 2002, p. 369). Borrowing systems 
differ in each country but the main means are banks (national, regional, state and 
sometimes even local banks), capital market, insurance or occasionally loans from 
higher levels of governments.  
 
Countries normally have a national legal and regulatory framework for sub-
national borrowing, which allows and specifies the access of borrowing to sub-
national governments. The soft budget constraint problem arises when sub-
national governments circumvent these restrictions in order to engage off-budget 
activities or issue debt to finance special functions. Moreover, poorly defined 
regulation or unrestricted borrowing engender the expectation that the central 
government is ultimately responsible for sub-national default risk. Therefore the 
credit market transfers the credit risk to the national level and creates over-
borrowing, because sub-national governments and their citizens perceive debt-
financed projects less costly than tax-financed ones. This process can compel the 
central government to offer a bailout, in order to avoid a national financial crisis 
(Vignault, 2003, p. 5). In an environment without clear rules of the game and 
strong enforcement, opportunity to soften the budget constraint remains strong.  
Borrowing by sub-national governments is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Central and Eastern Europe and regulations and practices vary significantly across 
countries. Despite the introduction of limits on borrowing and debt service in 
several countries, some of them still have no prohibition (Dafflon, Tòth, 2005, p. 
54). Ukraine is perhaps the worst case study in sub-national borrowing. Primarily, 
this country has no good debt legislation for all forms of debt, mentioning the type 
of debt, the method of securing such debt and the remedies upon default. Those 
important details are completely absent from the Law, as well as a requirement for 
independent audits or a legislation dealing with the insolvency of local 
governments (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 28-31). Moreover, there is no explicit 
legislation that states that the central government will not bail out sub-national 
governments’ debt. Secondly, the combination of all these factors has led to the 
creation of financial instruments that exacerbate the problem of arrears and non-
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cash payment. As a matter of fact, Ukrainian “veksel”, a bill of exchange legally 
accepted as short-term borrowing, is used by both public and private sectors. In 
practice, veksels transactions are a combination of mutual cancellation of debts 
among enterprises and offsetting arrangements that help localities to finance 
expenditures and enterprises to reduce tax arrears (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 
34). Veksels became a significant revenue source in sub-national tax collection 
and considerably raised sub-national arrears. Still in Ukraine and in relation to an 
immature financial system, sub-national governments have the ability to finance 
their deficits with loans at zero interest from higher level of government. These 
loans, allocated with high level of discretion, are unfortunately a direct 
contribution in the persistence of soft budget constraint. Indeed, sub-national 
governments do not really bear the costs of their bad fiscal performance and this 
tends to depress the maturity of the financial sector and its ability to discipline 
irresponsible fiscal behaviour (Vigneault, 2003, p. 24).  
 
The reorganization of the Chinese banking system also underlies soft budget 
constraint problem. Indeed, the banking reform tends to foster long-term 
financing and policy oriented project. A budget law therefore forbids local 
governments to borrow on the capital market, in order to avoid large amounts of 
sub-national deficits. Nevertheless local enterprises, which still depend on local 
government and represent de facto government agencies, can legally borrow from 
banks and on the capital markets. Such borrowing from local commercial banks 
by enterprises actually finances local government spending, as redundant small or 
medium-sized investment, and thus creates contingent liabilities. It ensues a 
proliferation of trust and investment companies under the jurisdiction of 
provincial and local government, which causes a lack of transparency on sub-
national government borrowing and thus difficulties to control excesses of debt 
(Jing, Heng-fu, 2003, p. 24-28). This form of borrowing engenders uncertainty 
about the real amount of sub-national debt and therefore softens the budget 
constraint.  
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1.5 “Too Big to Fail” hypothesis 
 
This section gives an itemized explanation of a commonly accepted origin of soft 
budget constraint problem. There is wide literature on the matter that the size of a 
sub-national entity could be important in explaining bailout. Despite the 
possibility to treat this point as part of the different sections above, the relevance 
of this hypothesis warrants the presentation in one unique section. Actually, 
several reasons may justify the bailout of a large jurisdiction because of the 
negative spillovers that its failing may cause to other sub-national communities. A 
first argument for bailing out a particular sub-national government may be its 
considerable importance on national elections because of the sizeable population. 
This example is closely related to the political mechanisms explained in a section 
above because of the major role of very populated states at the polls. Second, 
from an economic point of view, a strong sub-national entity might affect the 
national rate of growth in case of reduction of its growth rate. Moreover, a 
financial crisis in a region that possesses a high GDP may lead to a loss of 
confidence among foreign investors in the country (Trillo, Cayeros, Gonzales, 
2002, p. 371). Therefore the centre chooses a bailout ex post in order to avoid the 
negative externalities mentioned above. The central government may also decide 
to bail out in case of the provision of basic goods or services because of the 
positive externalities for other jurisdictions. Sub-national governments decide 
their level of provision, knowing ex ante that the centre will bail them out ex post. 
Thus the likelihood of bailout increases with the size of the externalities. 
According to this argument, bailouts are more likely in large size localities 
(Wildasin, 1997, p. 20-21). Transition and developing countries are obviously 
affected by the “Too Big to Fail” hypothesis, because of the existence of large 
states. For instance, Buenos Aires province has 38 percent of the nation’s 
population, 48 percent when combined with Buenos Aires city, and together they 
generate well over half of the national GDP (Webb, 2003, p. 4). In Brazil, states 
such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul also 
represents a major problem that undermines the credibility of the central 
government’s commitment not to bail out a state. Indeed, the default of such big 
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states represents a serious threat for the national macroeconomic stability. As a 
consequence, those states called for and obtained a bail out of their debt (Facchini, 
Testa, 2007, p. 343).  
 
1.6 Synthesis 
 
The table hereafter makes the connection between soft budget constraint 
mechanisms presented above and countries of the case studies. A cross signifies 
that a country is concerned by the indicated mechanism. The comments below 
indicate which factor(s) is/are more important for each country.  
 
Table 1 : The soft budget constraint mechanisms in the countries of case 
studies  
 
Argen-
tina 
Brazil China Hungary India Mexico 
South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
Vertical fiscal 
imbalance 
X X X X X X X X 
Intergovernmental 
finance and 
hierarchical 
relations 
X X X X X X X X 
Clarity in the 
distribution of exp. 
and rev. authority 
 X X X   X X 
Distribution of 
expenditure 
authority 
 X     X X 
Distribution of 
revenue authority 
 X      X 
Transfers X X X X X X  X 
Negotiated 
transfers 
X X X  X   X 
Gap filling 
transfers 
   X X    
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Argen-
tina 
Brazil China Hungary India Mexico 
South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
Equalization 
transfers 
   X     
National 
regulations 
X   X X   X 
Political 
mechanisms 
X X  X X X  X 
Information    X    X 
Coalition and term 
of office 
X X  X X X  X 
Borrowing X X X  X X  X 
Too Big to Fail 
hypothesis 
X X    X   
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Argentina: Sub-national governments pushed the limits of spending and 
borrowing because of the high dependence on transfers (high vertical fiscal 
imbalance). Soft budget constraint was stronger at the beginning of the 1990’s 
than at the end, since central government took measures to tighten fiscal 
discipline.  
 
Brazil: The main factors of fiscal indiscipline remain the lack of constitutional 
authority and the governor’s interests. One may note that the overall level of 
vertical fiscal imbalance is law, but the dependence on transfers varies 
dramatically from one state to another (Rodden, 2003b, p. 7).  
 
China: The core problem is clearly “the proliferation of trust and investment 
companies and securities houses under the jurisdictions of provincial and local 
governments” (Jing, Heng-fu, 2003, p. 28). This system of sub-national 
governments borrowing engenders a lack of transparency and may lead to over-
borrowing.  
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Hungary: As most of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, the Hungarian system of intergovernmental finance needed radical 
changes and adaptations to face different origins of soft budget constraint. Despite 
a certain number of fiscal indiscipline features, Hungary has developed several 
tools to strengthen sub-national budget constraints (refer to the next chapter for 
more details).  
 
India: Gap filling transfer and political realm, characterized by unstable coalitions 
and short term mandates, represent the main origins of soft budget constraint in 
India. Furthermore, sub-national government deficits still increase because of the 
dependence of small savings that represent a high charge of interest, especially for 
poorer state.  
 
Mexico: The Tequila crisis affected the credit markets and created large amounts 
of sub-national debt. In order to rescue its local entities, the federal government 
provided extraordinary transfers. This behaviour causes therefore soft budget 
constraint problems.  
 
South Africa: Joint responsibilities represent the major origin of soft budget 
constraint. However, provinces do not have any sources of own-taxes and are 
therefore transfer-dependant for the delivery of services.   
 
Ukraine: “The system as it currently functions creates incentives in almost every 
realm for soft budget constraints. In such a context, the lack of hard budget 
constraint cannot be attributed to a specific policy failure or the lack of a single 
mechanism. Rather it is a systemic failure” (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 1). As 
Hungary and other countries of the Former Soviet Union, Ukraine needs radical 
changes in intergovernmental finance and hierarchical relations to improve fiscal 
discipline. Furthermore, the chaotic Ukrainian political landscape is another 
sphere where changes may facilitate the hardening of budget constraint.  
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2. Mechanisms to harden budget constraint 
 
The first chapter focused on different possible origins of soft budget constraint 
problem for transition and developing countries. Despite the presence of one or 
several features that jeopardize fiscal discipline, most of the countries of the case 
studies also establish mechanisms intended to harden budget constraint of sub-
national governments. Rather than describing an exhaustive list of measures that 
discourage fiscal indiscipline, this second chapter explores solutions and 
processes used to improve fiscal discipline in transition and developing countries 
of the case studies. This consequently gives a more practical approach than 
presenting theoretical solutions, which do not take into account the transitional 
aspect of those different countries.  
Explanations are classified into two main sections, namely institutional reform 
and political competition. One might emphasize that one solution will not work 
for all the cases and that some “solutions” may do more harm than good under the 
wrong conditions (Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 37).  
 
2.1 Institutional reform 
 
The institutional reform appears differently in case studies, although central 
government commonly modifies or even creates new regulations in order to 
monitor their sub-national entities. In reforming legislations, conceiving new laws 
or hardening existing ones, the centre tries to lessen the behavioural incentives 
that soften sub-national budget constraint. An interesting point of view asserts that 
fiscal crises and even large bailouts provide some of the best opportunities to 
reform the institutional framework. Indeed, a financial rescue allows the 
opportunity for negotiations and improvements in institutions that otherwise 
would be difficult, if not impossible (Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 43-44). In this 
way, the central government can signal that the rules of the game to be played in 
the future will be different. The first part examines hierarchical mechanisms used 
by central government to oversee the fiscal behaviour of sub-national entities. The 
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second explains the essential changes for a competitive capital market, a 
necessary condition to constraint sub-national borrowing.  
 
2.1.1 Hierarchical mechanisms 
Implementation of hierarchical mechanisms is an important change in institutional 
reforms. In fact, the lack of oversight lets sub-national governments free to run 
deficits or rely on arrears and leads to the softness of budget constraint. In 
reforming regulations, the centre invites “oversight from voters and creditors by 
forcing local government to provide information, including accounting and 
auditing procedures” (Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 43). In the next two next sub-
parts are respectively presented rules and laws that promote incentives for fiscal 
discipline.  
 
Rules 
The creation or the tightening of rules on debt, transfers or sub-national 
governments’ budget constraint is a key issue. Hereafter are presented 
institutional restructurings in transition and developing countries of the case 
studies. A common strategy remains, placing limitations on debt, for example 
limiting the aggregate stock of long-term debt to a fixed share of the sub-national 
tax base. Another type of strategy that regulates the use of debt by sub-national 
government is permitting long-term borrowing to capital projects only (Rodden, 
Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 28). Rules on borrowing have been implemented with 
success in Hungary, due to the consequences on local governments’ behaviour. 
Those rules fix a real constraint on the borrowing behaviour and generate 
incentives to cut costs and particularly to raise revenue efforts (Rodden, Eskeland, 
2003, p. 42). Significant restructuring in the financial and fiscal intergovernmental 
system may also be a fundamental institutional reform. The rationalizing of fiscal 
transfers between different tiers of governments or the decrease of discretionary 
transfers reduces the possibility to negotiate annual grants or to prevent 
expectation of additional transfers in the presence of a fiscal crisis. In addition, 
one must legislate the ability of all levels of government to control certain types 
of expenditure and to collect their own taxes. The “Pacto Fiscal I and II” 
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negotiated by the Argentinean central government in respectively 1992 and 1993 
illustrate an interesting reorganization of expenditure and transfer areas. Among 
other reforms, the central government transferred federal health and secondary 
school programme to provinces and federalized the pension plan in order to 
eliminate the need to subsidize pensions from the general treasury. Although the 
relevance of these changes is significant, provinces continue to circumvent the 
rules “due to the long history in Argentina of circumventing budget constraint” 
(Webb, 2003, p. 14-16).  
 
Dafflon and Tòth (2005, p. 52-54) suggest a relevant solution of budget orthodoxy 
for transition countries, based on the Swiss budget policy. The application of the 
“golden rule”, which induces that “local current revenues net of current 
expenditures are sufficient to serve the debt interest and bear the running costs of 
past and new investments”, is a first type of regulation. If a sub-national 
government does not follow this rule, the central government might decide to 
raise its annual coefficient of taxation. A second rule allows public debt only for 
“financing capital expenditure and if the sub-national government has the 
financial capacity to pay the interest and amortization of the debt out of its current 
budget”. However, this debt limitation requires a distinction between current and 
capital budgets. Most of the transition and developing countries do not separate 
them and this renders the implementation of this second rule difficult to control.  
 
Hierarchical control is also the management of sub-national governments budget. 
Different kind of policy measures may be implemented, such as a multi-year 
budgeting process in South Africa or control mechanisms over local spending and 
borrowing in Hungary. The first case aimed the establishment of a set of rules that 
ensures ex-post balanced budget through top-down process. This includes the 
determination of the levels of resources available for intergovernmental transfers 
over a three to five year period and a direct monitoring of provincial budgets 
(Ahmad, 2003, p. 15). The second case is even more restrictive with sub-national 
government because Hungarian central government regulates local government 
borrowing, requires balanced budgets and enforces numerical debt service limits. 
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The ministry of finance oversees budget processes at all levels of government and 
controls therefore ex-ante payments against budget appropriations (Rodden, 
Eskeland, 2003, p. 30). Actually countries with high levels of vertical fiscal 
imbalance, in other words lower levels of government extremely dependent on 
transfers, really need to implement top-down fiscal restrictions. Indeed, central 
government knows that it could ultimately be held responsible in case of fiscal 
profligacy. A successful hierarchical oversight prevents the central government 
from bailout demands.  
 
Laws 
Despite positive consequences in the use of rules, one of the best mechanisms 
remains the provision of good incentives through laws that regulate fiscal 
activities. For instance, the “Fiscal Responsibility Law” and the “Penal Law for 
Fiscal Crimes” established in the year 2000 in Brazil deal with a wide range of 
fiscal problems. One describes hereafter the general content of those laws, 
because it reflects common problems of transition and developing countries. This 
new legislation attempts to limit personnel expenditures and includes prohibitions 
on wage increases and new hires. This aims to solve the problem of excessive 
state borrowing because of high personnel expenditures. Threats exist to punish 
sub-national governments that fail in those expenditure targets or that violate the 
yearly debt limits. Actually, the new legislation increases the role of the judiciary 
and the penal system, in order to enhance the enforcement of the law. For instance 
illegal efforts to issue public bonds includes prison sentences or mayors may be 
stripped if debt limits or personnel expenditure ratios are exceeded. Even severer, 
omission of an expenditure item in a budget or a misrepresentation in a revenue 
calculation are subject to penal suit (Rodden, 2003b, p. 31-32). A last important 
point remains: the new securities regulations that introduce uniform accounting, 
planning and transparency requirement that entail a better assessment of local 
performance by voters and creditors. Hungary also modifies its legal framework 
in this way and added another very interesting legislation that regulates local 
government insolvency and bankruptcy. The “Municipal Bankruptcy Law” 
creates a prospect for default resolution in the event of insolvency and provides 
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reorganization and workout procedures for the municipality. The Law also sets 
out a method that ensures the provisions of mandated services even during a 
period of insolvency. Moreover, the legislation states that the central government 
will not guarantee local borrowing and provide incentives for sub-national 
government to collect its own taxes (Wetzel, Papp, 2003, p. 33-35). The set of 
procedures about sub-national bankruptcy avoids pressure on the centre in case of 
fiscal crisis. Furthermore, the implementation of courts and arbitrators (through 
penal and judiciary systems) give a strong signal to local governments and 
creditors that the centre will not intervene with bailout anymore (Rodden, 
Eskeland, 2003, p. 43).  
 
The examples of rules or laws exposed above show how the central government 
tries to make explicit its commitment to say “no” when pressed for bailouts. 
However, “hierarchical mechanisms are only as good as the strength and 
credibility of the central government’s commitment to stand by them and enforce 
them” (Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 36). In the case studies of India or Brazil, 
factors such as fragmented political institutions have undermined hierarchical 
discipline implied by institutional reforms. Therefore, hierarchical control may be 
defined as necessary but not sufficient to harden budget constraint. The central 
government must supervise the enforcement of rules or laws by sub-national 
government because entities may try to circumvent them in order to spend or 
borrow as much as they want. The next part presents mechanisms for an efficient 
capital market, which also plays an important role in the institutional framework.  
 
2.1.2 Capital Markets  
The performance of capital markets is an obvious condition in guiding and 
constraining sub-national fiscal activities. Moreover, a competitive capital market 
requires efficient supportive institutions. Indeed, financial intermediaries have to 
foster a free and competitive access to capital funds by avoiding dysfunctional 
characteristics such as political influence. Owners and institutions have therefore 
to select good credit objects, because disciplined credit markets may punish poor 
fiscal performance with higher borrowing cost or limited access. However, a 
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competitive capital market is not a sufficient way to harden budget constraints. 
The central government must have a credible “no bailout” policy, because lenders 
may continue to grant sub-national loans if they perceive the likelihood of bailout 
in case of bad fiscal performance (Rodden, Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 21-22). 
However, central as well as state banks must also to tighten the access to credit in 
order to avoid over-borrowing. For instance, the Argentinean Central Bank 
revised its charter in order to make explicit its role as “no lender of last resort” for 
provinces. It took means to harden the budget constraint on provinces by limiting 
the ability to borrow from state banks and eliminating the access to central bank 
financing (Webb, 2003, p. 12). Identically, the Brazilian government implemented 
new banking regulations and some moves towards the autonomy of the National 
Monetary Council and Central Bank. Still in the banking system, the privatization 
of states banks also contributes to tighten the sub-national borrowing. The goals 
of the previous resolutions are the restriction on borrowing from state banks, the 
imposition on new borrowing ceilings and the limitation of new bond issues 
(Rodden, 2003b, p. 30). Another national government took decisive means to 
reform the capital market and reduce its access to sub-national governments. In 
South Africa, central government decided to regulate the borrowing powers of 
local government in legislating a specific act and specifies new rules about 
municipal bankruptcy (Ahmad, 2003, p. 10).  
 
2.2 Political factors 
 
The political sphere represents a potential form of fiscal discipline for sub-
national government through the competition for political power. Indeed, 
democracy lets voters the choice to punish or reward their representatives, local as 
well as national. Fiscally irresponsible governments may go out of office if voters 
face transparent information about local performance and if they have enough 
authority and incentives to do so. Free and fair elections with vigorous opposition 
compel fiscal decisions of sub-national governments. Political parties following 
different ideologies effectively harden budget constraint because competition 
between each other functions as a control mechanism. Moreover, autonomous 
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medias, which are not connected with government or under political influence, 
may also improve the transparency of information and therefore exacerbates the 
respect of fiscal discipline. Still linked with political competition, the mechanism 
through which power is allocated may foster hard budget constraint. Career 
incentive, that is politicians’ incentive of re-election, clearly mitigates 
opportunistic behaviour and the risk of large deficits. Bad fiscal performance 
undermines credibility and may signify the end of a political career, hence the 
importance of fiscal discipline in a competitive political system (Rodden, 
Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 23-24). South Africa is one of the only countries of the 
case studies that have really improved its political realm. In order to strengthen 
fiscal discipline, communities have been able to directly elect their 
representatives. This new electoral process represents a first step to limit the 
ability of local authorities to engage in unsustainable fiscal decisions (Ahmad, 
2003, p. 18-19). 
 
The mobility of economical factors also put local officials under pressure, as it 
has a direct influence on the price of immobile assets. As explained above, voters 
have the possibility to reward or punish their representatives in “voicing”. On the 
other hand, workers and residents can also express their interests through the 
threat of “exit”, in leaving the jurisdiction to reach a better compromise between 
taxes and services. The credibility of this threat affects the local politician choices 
in order to protect their tax base. Despite the weight of this mechanism, its 
effectiveness requires a certain number of strong assumptions that are difficult to 
find in transition and developing countries. This model is difficult to apply with 
“large jurisdictions, heavy dependence on agriculture and large state-owned 
enterprises, or in fragmented settings with important ethic and linguistic cleavages 
across jurisdictions” (Rodden, Eskeland, Litvack, eds, p. 25-26). In addition, other 
features such as collusion or intergovernmental equalization transfers lessen 
efficiency of this mechanism. It therefore receives negligible attention in case 
studies and does not represent a very relevant argument for this paper.  
The proportion of owners and renters in a community may bias the borrowing and 
consumption choices in favour of investments. Assuming that residents are 
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owners, they have therefore incentives to handle local affairs and to take into 
account long-term consequences of sub-national government borrowing. Since 
they approve local fiscal decision, owners directly face the consequences through 
tax payment and land prices. On the other hand, renters may have an insufficient 
financial interest in the future of the sub-national community because of their 
easier possibility to move away. The residents of a community have therefore a 
direct impact on local government management, and owners may exacerbate the 
enforcement of fiscal discipline.  
 
2.3 Synthesis 
 
The table hereafter makes connection between hard budget constraint mechanims 
presented above and countries of the case studies. A cross signifies that the 
country implemented a mechanism, successfully or not. The comments below 
gives more details on their success or respectively, their failure.  
 
Table 2 : The hard budget constraint mechanisms in the countries of case 
studies  
 Argentina Brazil China Hungary India Mexico 
South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
Institutional 
reform 
X X X X X X X  
Hierarchical 
mechanism 
X X X X X X X  
Rules X X  X X X X  
Laws  X  X   X  
Capital 
Market 
X X  X   X  
Political 
competition 
      X  
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Argentina: “The various measures to harden provincial budget constraints 
succeeded in part because they were set in the context of a broader adjustment 
programme that was perceived, correctly, to be essential for the rescue of the 
overall economy” (Webb, 2003, p. 27). Indeed, the Tequila crisis permitted the 
implementation of new fiscal rules. However, the system needs some changes for 
a long-term efficiency because Argentina is still vulnerable, especially during bad 
economic times.  
 
Brazil: The central government has tools to limit fiscal indiscipline. However, the 
effectiveness of the instruments implemented has been undermined by 
administrative and political fragmentation, particularly by governors’ interests 
(Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 34).  
 
India: The hierarchical mechanisms in this case study encounter great problems, 
notably with political fragmentation and short term of office. Despite the lack of 
mechanisms to implement hard budget constraints, “liberalization of economic 
markets and decentralization have made India ripe for more institutional reform” 
(McCarten, 2003, p. 40).  
 
In India and Brazil, fragmented political institutions undermine the central 
government’s commitment for a “no bailout” policy. This leads to claim that 
political realm has a strong influence in the enforcement of institutional change. 
Actually, “the most important but vexing hard budget constraint mechanism is an 
active and informed public with incentives and tools to oversee government 
decision-making” (Rodden, Eskeland, 2003, p. 45).  
 
China: Two reforms in the revenues and spending responsibilities were 
implemented in the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Nevertheless, the main problem in 
China remains the indirect borrowing through investment companies and nothing 
has been done to correct this distortion yet.  
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Hungary: The measures adopted in Hungary represent a systemic reform which 
allows the improvement of local government’s performance. In limiting 
borrowing and imposing strong hierarchical controls, the central government 
oversees the fiscal behaviour of sub-national entities.  
 
Mexico: The government implemented a rules-based approach with adequate 
results in a short-term period. However, additional actions should be taken in 
order to enforce sub-national fiscal discipline.  
 
South Africa: “South Africa’s experience so far suggests that a framework of a 
hard budget constraint in a multi-tiered government cannot be imposed through 
one specific channel; such a magic bullet is elusive. Instead a systemic policy 
approach in which hierarchical regulatory control, fiscal tools, markets, and 
community accountability all are needed to provide the right incentive for each 
tier of government to be held accountable for their management of economic 
affairs” (Amhad, 2003, p. 24-25).  
 
Ukraine: As already mentioned, the Ukrainian case represents a systemic failure 
and no mechanisms for implementing a hard budget constraint was successfully 
put into place yet (O’Connell, Wetzel, 2003, p. 1).  
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II. MODELS OF THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT PROBLEM 
 
The first part of this paper exposes the origins of the soft budget constraint 
problem in transition and developing countries. As exhibited in the table 1, 
different causes usually compose a country’s fiscal profligacy. The cases of 
Eastern Europe countries and the former Soviet Union demonstrate it particularly 
well. Despite this reality, authors have tried to develop models of soft budget 
constraint in examining precise mechanisms of bailout and their implication in the 
economic world. The second part of this paper therefore focuses on fundamental 
models of the soft budget constraint problem. Chapter three explains a model 
applying to equalization transfers and their impact on regional government. In 
fact, Goodspeed (2002) hypothesizes that the central government creates a soft 
budget constraint in allocating equalization grants. Chapter four presents a model 
of bailout based on externalities and jurisdiction size. Wildasin (1997) effectively 
assumes that central authorities have incentives to prop up the finances of local 
governments when the public services provided locally benefit the rest of the 
society. Furthermore, this author postulates an important principle about the 
incentives for bailouts when local governments are considered “Too big to fail”. 
Chapter five introduces an overview of models related to commitment problems 
and bailouts. Facchini and Testa (2007) develop a model close to Wildasin’s 
hypotheses, as they also include borrowing and externalities in their framework. 
The soft budget constraint problem modelled by Qian and Roland (1998) is also 
briefly summarized. In addition to dealing with state-owned enterprises, their 
model proposed the first macroeconomic model viewed as a dynamic 
commitment problem in the framework of a federal government. Their findings 
on fiscal competition and monetary centralization have had a strong impact on 
other researches. For instance, Köthenbürger (2003) examines capital tax 
competition in the presence of grants policies without federal commitment. His 
model shows further implications of the commitment problem and symbolizes 
another view of bailouts. To conclude this second part, the last section sets out 
two additional developments on the soft budget constraint issue in explaining the 
researches of Akai and Sato (2005) and Bordignon and Turati (2005). 
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3. Equalization transfers, common pool and bailout 
 
Goodspeed (2002, p. 409-421) develops a model of central government transfer 
decisions and inter-temporal regional spending when there is an interaction 
between the levels of government via transfers. This political economy model 
assumes that the central government uses transfers to maintain a certain quantity 
of regional spending that is politically optimal. These central grants allocations 
pursue equalization principles, as the centre allocates transfers to equate the 
weighted marginal utility of regions’ voters and thereby maximize its expected 
votes. This central government’s behaviour creates a soft budget constraint and 
engenders two incentives effects, a common pool effect on tax payments and an 
opportunity cost effect. The organization of this chapter is designed as follows. 
The next section sets out the hypotheses and the context of the model. The second 
section explains the central and regional governments problem, as Goodspeed 
solves his model with backward induction. The third part presents a summary and 
conclusions of this chapter. 
 
3.1. Hypotheses  
 
Hypotheses are divided into three distinct parts: the basic framework, the 
sequential game and the interaction between the levels of governments.  
 
Goodspeed uses a model within a Federation that includes two types of players, 
namely the central government and N regional governments.  
H1) Region i is inhabited by 
! 
n
i
 people, where 
! 
i =1,...,N . 
H2) The utility of the representative consumer of the region i is assumed to be a 
function of the private and public consumptions represented hereafter:  
! 
C
i1
 and 
! 
C
i2
 the private consumption in periods 1 and 2,  
! 
G
i1
 and 
! 
G
i2
 the per-capita public consumption in periods 1 and 2,  
! 
Y
i1
 and 
! 
Y
i2
 the private income of the representative consumer in each period.  
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The basic set-up embodies a two-period inter-temporal model. 
H3) An initial level of grants for each region is defined before the beginning of 
the game by the central government, denoted 
! 
gi1. This decision is exogenous to 
the game to be played.  
H4) Still in this first period, the region is able to borrow an amount per capita for 
public consumption in period 1, denoted 
! 
Bi1
g  and chooses a period 1 tax rate.  
H5) Consumers have the opportunity to borrow an amount for private 
consumption in period 1, denoted by 
! 
B
i1
c .  
H6) In period 2, regions choose a tax rate and the central government decides a 
second period per-capita grants, denoted 
! 
gi2 . 
 
Strategic interactions exist among the regions, as well as between the regions and 
the central government: 
H7) Interaction between regional governments: they are assumed to move 
simultaneously and make a choice concerning borrowing and taxation in period 1. 
A Nash Equilibrium is obtained, in which each region takes the other regions’ 
borrowing and tax rates as given. In the second period, regional governments 
again move simultaneously and select a period 2 tax rate.  
H8) Interaction between the central government and the regional government: the 
central government moves in period 2 and decides regions’ second period grant 
level. Respecting regional borrowing and first period taxation, the interaction 
between the central government and regional government is consequently 
sequential with the regional government moving first. A Stackelberg game is 
played, namely a model with perfect information. The regional government 
knows therefore how the central government will react in the second period and 
takes into account the reaction function of the central government in its choice of 
borrowing in the first period. The regional government also chooses a tax rate in 
the second period and that represents a second interaction with the centre. 
However, this latter interaction is simultaneous and the region takes the central 
government grant decision as given when it chooses a second period taxes.  
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3.2 Central and regional governments’ problems 
 
The model implicates both the behaviour of the regional governments in period 1 
and the regional and central governments in period 2. Goodspeed uses the method 
of backward induction to solve the sequential game between the central and 
regional governments. This means the presentation of the central government’s 
problem in period 2 and the resolution of the regional government’s behaviour in 
period 1 in using that solution.  
 
3.2.1 Central government’s problem 
The most important assumption is that the central government is politically 
motivated and chooses an amount of regional grant in period 2 that maximises its 
expected votes. Letting 
! 
pi  denote the probability that a voter in region i votes to 
re-elect the government, the centre chooses a vector 
! 
g
2
 = 
! 
gl 2,...,gm2{ }  to  
! 
Max
g2
ni
i
" pi(ui(Gi1) + ui(Gi2) + wi(Ci1) + zi(Ci2))    (1) 
Since the central government moves second, it must take as given the regional 
governments’ borrowing and taxation choices from period 1. The regional 
government choice of tax rate in period 2 is also taken as given, since the central 
government plays Nash with respect to this choice. The first order conditions are 
! 
ni
"pi
"# i
"# i
"Gi2
$ nk
k=1
m
%
"pk
"zk
"zk
"C
2k
niYk2
nk Yk2
k
%
= 0  for all i  (2) 
The central government equates then the weighted marginal utility of increased 
grants to a region and the marginal cost of increased taxes that must be paid by all 
regions. Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions simplify to 
! 
"pi
"# i
"# i
"Gi2
=
"p j
"# j
"# j
"Gj 2
  for all i, j    (3) 
That is, the central government will equate the weighted marginal utility of 
regions’ voters. The weights depend on the increase in probability that a resident 
of a region will vote for the central government in place.  
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The central government’s reaction in period 2 to a region’s borrowing decision in 
period 1 represents a crucial commitment problem. A soft budget constraint arises 
when the centre feels political pressure and increases a region’s grant allocation in 
period 2. In adopting this behaviour, the centre lowers the opportunity costs of 
borrowing for the region, as the grant pays off a part of the debt. In resisting to 
political pressure, the centre creates a hard budget constraint.  
The central government’s behavioural response to regional government borrowing 
can be derived, by examining the central government’s reaction function. The first 
order conditions (3) implicitly define the central government’s reaction function 
(that is its optimal choice of grants 
! 
gi2
*
,...,gm2
*{ } as a function of borrowing). 
Solving implicitly for this set of functions yields  
! 
gi2
*
= f i2
"# i
"Gi2
(Bi1)
$ 
% 
& ,
"pi
"# i
(Bi1)
' 
( 
)   for all i   (4) 
The central government’s grant decision for region i in period 2 will depend on 
region i’s borrowing in period 1. The derivative of this function with respect to 
borrowing explains how the central government will adjust its allocation of grants 
to a region in period 2 if that region borrows in the first period. Before deriving 
the slope of the reaction function, one must consider two special cases: 
 
A hard budget constraint policy: the central government resists any temptation to 
increase region’s grants in the second period when that region borrows in the first. 
That is, the centre chooses beforehand the amount of grants, regardless the 
region’s borrowing decision. This supposes that 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
= 0  for all i. Although 
the efficiency of such strategy, one will see that it is not credible. 
 
A soft budget constraint policy: the central government finds optimal to increase a 
region’s period 2 allocation of grants when that region borrows. This lowers the 
opportunity cost for the regional government because the grants pay back a part of 
its borrowing. This supposes that 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
> 0  for all i. This inefficient strategy 
will happen in the present model. 
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The derivative of the central government’s reaction function with respect to 
borrowing gives  
! 
"f i2
"Bi1
=#GG
"Gi2
"Bi1
+ p##
"# i
"Gi2
"Gi2
"Bi1
     (5) 
The sign of this derivative reveals whether the central government will pursue a 
soft budget constraint policy in the second period. Hereafter the sections discuss 
the two additive parts of the derivative. 
 
The two components of the first term are negative, this latter therefore indicates 
that part of the central government’s reaction will be to increase grants to the 
borrowing region. Indeed, this term is working to make 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
> 0 . Goodspeed 
gives the following explanation: if the central government does not increase 
grants, the region must reduce its period 2 public consumption which increases 
the marginal utility of period 2 public consumption in the region. Since the central 
government is using the grants to get the region to what it perceives to be an 
optimal consumption of public good in period 2, it must increase period 2 grants 
to offset the region’s behaviour and achieve this aim.  
 
The second additive term of the derivative consists of three multiplicative terms. 
The last is negative, as higher borrowing in the first period reduces public good 
consumption in the second. The next to the last is positive, since lower public 
good consumption in period 2 lowers utility. Thus the sign of the second additive 
part of the derivative depends on the sign of 
! 
p"" . The intuitive reasoning makes 
! 
p"" negative for the same reason that marginal utility intuitively decreases. In 
other words, at high levels of utility, a small increase in utility is likely to make a 
slight difference in voting behaviour while at low levels of utility, it might make a 
great deal of difference. According to the probability of voting for the incumbent 
that increases at a decreasing rate with utility, the second additive component is 
positive, and the second additive term is also working to make 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
> 0 . 
Goodspeed considers the second additive term as political in nature and gives the 
following justification as proof. If the centre does not increase grants, the region 
must reduce its period 2 public consumption which decreases utility. If 
! 
p"" < 0 , 
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the marginal probability that a resident votes for the incumbent (i.e. the weight in 
the first order condition) is higher than it was before the region borrowed. By 
increasing grants to the region, the central government can therefore garner more 
votes. If 
! 
p"" = 0 , the marginal probability that a resident votes for the incumbent 
does not change with the level of utility and the second additive term is zero. 
Assuming 
! 
p"" = 0  or 
! 
p"" < 0  and the unambiguous positive value of the first 
term, the slope of the reaction function is thus unambiguously positive. This 
means that the central government’s incentives are to increase a region's grant 
with its borrowing. 
A crucial fact of this model remains the basic commitment problem of the central 
government. Indeed, the centre uses transfers to maintain a certain quantity of 
regional spending that it considers politically optimal because it maximises its re-
election chances. This point of view prevents the centre to commit a credible “no 
bailout” policy beforehand. The regional government knows that when it comes to 
period 2 and uses its first-mover position to take advantage of central government 
preferences. 
 
3.2.2 Regional government’s problem 
The regional government i is assumed to maximize utility of a representative 
consumer of region i subject to constraints on private and public consumption in 
each of the two periods, the regional and central government budget constraints 
and the reaction function of the central government. Playing a Stackelberg game 
with perfect information, one may assume that the regional government knows the 
reaction function of the centre.  
Regional government i’s problem is therefore 
! 
Max
Bi1
c
,Bi1
G
,ti1 ,ti 2
u
i
(G
i1
) +"(G
i2
) + w
i
(C
i1
) + z
i
(C
i2
)     (6) 
The first order condition, which possibly deviates from efficiency, results in  
! 
"ui
"Gi1
# 1#
"f i2
"Bi1
G
$ 
% 
& 
' 
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(1+ r) #
"zi
"Ci2
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j=1
m
+
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& 
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) 
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j=1
m
+ = 0  (7) 
which reduces to  
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) 
* 
* 
j=1
m
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G
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' 
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The price faced by the regional government when it borrows consists of two 
distinct parts. The first term results from the common pool problem. If region i 
borrows $1 and the central government increases grants to region j by 
! 
"f j2 "Bi1
G , 
region i must pay a part of the cost engendered by the increase in grants. This 
term represents therefore the tax price to region i resulting from an increase in 
grants to any and all regions. The second term indicates the opportunity cost of 
! 
G
1
 
in terms of the foregone 
! 
G
2
. Increasing grants to the region reduces the region’s 
opportunity cost. The most important feature of the region’s incentives is the 
derivative of the reaction function of the central government. Goodspeed proposes 
to consider once again the two special cases exposed previously. 
 
Hard budget constraint, that supposes 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
= 0  for all i. Under this policy, the 
central government does not change its initial allocation of grants when a region 
borrows. The opportunity cost is thus 1+r, since borrowing must be paid for by 
reducing next period’s revenues by the amount of borrowing plus interest. 
Moreover, there is no tax cost. As already remarked with the central government’s 
behaviour, it cannot credibly commit to a no bailout policy beforehand. As a 
result, the regional government will not rationally expect following this central 
government’s policy. 
 
Soft budget constraint, that supposes 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
> 0  for all i. Under this policy, the 
central government increases a region’s future grants when it borrows. The failure 
of the hard budget constraint policy includes two consequences for the region. 
Firstly the opportunity cost of borrowing is lowered since less period 2 public 
consumption must be given up to pay off the debt. This is represented by the 
second term of (8) and implies a greater amount of borrowing than under a hard 
budget constraint. Secondly, there is a rise in tax payment represented by the first 
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term of (8). This rise, which represents only a portion of each dollar borrowed, 
implies a higher price and less borrowing than under the hard budget constraint. 
Goodspeed identifies two sub-case of soft budget constraint. First, the centre may 
increase only the grants of the borrowing region so that  
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
= 0  for all 
! 
i " j . 
Such behaviour results because the central government’s re-election chances 
depend on it equating the weighted marginal utility of region’s voters. When a 
region’s borrowing disturbs this equality, the central government will attempt to 
adjust its grants to maximize its chances of re-election. The taxes rise by only a 
portion of the additional grants received and the region’s increase in cost due to 
additional taxes is less than its decrease in the opportunity cost of borrowing. This 
leads to excessive borrowing. Second, one may assume that the central 
government increases grants not only to the borrowing region but also to other 
regions so that 
! 
"f i2 "Bi1
G
> 0  for 
! 
i " j . The difference with the first sub-case lies in 
the fact that the central government essentially punishes the borrowing region 
when it increases grants to other regions, as the additional grants are given to 
other regions. The interesting view is that the rise in taxes may be so great that it 
offsets the lower opportunity cost resulting from its own increased grants. In other 
words, it exists a type of soft budget constraint that results in efficient borrowing. 
However, this model does not deal with this sub-case, as the reaction function (4) 
is not a function of the borrowing of regions other than region i. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Regions’ incentives depend on the reaction function of the central government. 
The political model of Goodspeed leads to interesting conclusions on budget 
constraint policies, based on the assumption that grants equate the marginal utility 
of regions’ voters and thereby maximise central government’s expected votes. A 
hard budget constraint policy, which leads to efficient borrowing incentives for 
regional governments, remains inefficient since the centre cannot credibly commit 
such a policy. On the other side, a soft budget constraint policy engenders two 
effects on incentives of regional government, namely a common pool problem 
and an opportunity cost effect. Indeed, the soft budget constraint lowers the 
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opportunity cost of borrowing for the regional government, but also increases the 
tax cost since a portion of the borrowing must be paid for through increased taxes. 
As long as other region’s grants do not change as a result of a given region’s 
borrowing, the common pooling effect on tax payment implies that the increased 
tax cost must be less than the decrease in the opportunity cost. This leads to over-
borrowing. An interesting element of this model remains the possibility for the 
central government to punish the borrowing region in increasing grants to other 
regions enough to deter excessive borrowing by any region. In fact, the borrowing 
region must pay a portion of the tax increase for those grants increase and this 
finally leads to efficient borrowing decisions.  
Goodspeed proposes a relevant model that deals with several features of fiscal 
recklessness mentioned in the first part of this paper. He effectively builds his 
analysis on an equalization transfer system in relation with sub-national 
borrowing incentives, in paying attention to politics. Moreover, he finds valuable 
conclusions about the common pool problem and the opportunity cost effect. The 
considerable number of citations about Goodspeed’s model by other famous 
authors proves that he wrote an influential paper. Furthermore, he inspires 
researchers for new kind of models, such as Breuillé, Madiès and Taugourdeau 
(2005). Based on the model explained above, they “set up a simple model of 
central government transfer decisions with inter-temporal regional budgetary 
decisions when both horizontal and vertical tax externalities are at work” 
(Breuillé, Madiès, Taugourdeau, 2005, p. 231). Their paper belongs to the 
literature that proposes a new view on commitment problem, in examining the 
impact of tax competition on budget constraint. They find that tax interactions 
harden the regional budget constraint when the region is not deeply in debt, 
whereas they have no effect on central government transfer behaviour. 
Goodspeed’s model suggests that the derivative of the reaction function may 
depend on political factors. One of the only other models that endogenously 
derive soft budget constraint bailout behaviour on the part of the central 
government is Wildasin’s model. This author assumes that the reaction function 
may also depend on regional government’s size. The next chapter will deal with 
this author’s view.  
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4. Externalities, jurisdiction size and bailout 
 
The general content of this chapter attempts to ask why some lower-level 
governments fall into fiscal crises that seem to require interventions by higher-
level governments while others do not. Wildasin (1997, p.1-36) proposes a model 
that deals with external effects created by the provision of a local public good, 
corrected with a Pigouvian tax. Indeed, this author explores the hypothesis that 
the central government acts to maximize the welfare of households residing 
outside of the locality that is being considered for a bailout. Moreover, this model 
considers under which conditions the centre would intervene in the local fiscal 
affairs, in which case localities face soft budget constraint. In addition, this author 
also develops an interesting point concerning the behaviour of localities, which 
have partly their budget constraint in their hands and may decide the 
attractiveness of a bailout.  
 
However, the reputation of Wildasin’s bailout model remains in his jurisdiction 
size analysis, which interprets the relationship between jurisdiction size and 
hardness of budget constraint. In fact, this model underlies the “Too big to fail” 
hypothesis, which is especially important in regards to the consequences it may 
engender. This hypothesis primarily refers to the banking literature with the 
“lender of last resort” theory. This means that a lender, usually the central bank of 
a country, has to prevent the collapse of banks or national institutions that are 
facing financial problem. In other words, the lender of last resort protects the 
national economy against the dramatic externalities that the collapse of a financial 
institution may engender. Nevertheless the potential bailout in case of problems 
gives institutions the temptation to take more risks on the capital markets. 
Wildasin linked this theory with jurisdiction size, since the failing of a large sub-
national government may create negative spillovers on other national entities and 
may even affect the national economy.  
 
The organization of this chapter is designed as follows. The next section sets out 
the hypotheses and the context of the model. The second section explains the 
 - 44 - 
external effects’ model which is divided into subdivisions exposing central and 
regional governments problem, as Wildasin solves his model with backward 
induction. The third section deals with Wildsin’s famous jurisdiction size 
analysis, while the fourth presents a summary and conclusions of the chapter. 
 
 4.1 Hypotheses 
 
This model is based on two strong hypotheses. 
H1) Local governments provide public goods, which not only benefit their own 
residents but that produce external benefits for residents of other localities as well.  
The central government acts therefore in the interest of the whole society and 
establishes a programme of intergovernmental transfers that function as Pigouvian 
corrective subsidies.  
H2) There is a sequential structure with decision-making. Firstly, the centre 
moves in establishing a programme of corrective intergovernmental transfers. 
Localities accept this policy and choose their level of local taxes and 
expenditures. However, there is a third stage and the centre can move last, after 
observing local fiscal decisions, by taking direct control over local expenditures 
and by financing incremental local spending from central funds. In other words, 
this third stage corresponds to a bailout from the centre and, if it occurs, reveals 
that the local government budget constraint has been soft.  
 
The following numerous assumptions are needed to understand Wildasin’s bailout 
model. The five distinct parts are the basic framework, households’ consumption, 
governments’ fiscal situation, the equilibria and the sequential game.  
 
The model includes three types of actors: the central government, localities and 
their households. 
H3) Localities are of identical size, i.e. they contain equal numbers of residents. 
According to that parameter, the degree of fiscal decentralization is thus related to 
the size of local governments. The degree of fiscal decentralization becomes low 
with only a few large jurisdictions, whereas it is high when it encompasses small 
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and numerous jurisdictions. This model will explain how jurisdiction size affects 
the hardness of local budget constraint.  
H4) N represents the total population of the economy. Population is partitioned 
into local jurisdictions, which are assumed all to contain the same number of 
households, n. Households are immobile among jurisdictions.  
 
Let’s consider the following households’ consumption and the externalities they 
generate.  
H5) Households are assumed to have identical preferences and endowments and 
they consume three commodities:  
x for all-purpose private good which will serve as numeraire. Each household is 
endowed with w units of this commodity.  
z represents the consumption of good, which may be health, water or education 
and that yields external benefits to other households.  
G is a Samuelson public good whose level of provision is determined by the 
central government.  
Note that external effects of good z create interdependency among households. 
Thus suppose that each household h has a strictly quasi-concave utility function 
! 
u(x
h
,z
h
,Z,G) where 
! 
Z " #(z
h '
h'
$ ) , with 
! 
" # > 0 > " " # . Here, 
! 
(x
h
,z
h
)  is household 
h’s own-consumption of goods x and z; the parameter Z reflects the external 
benefits to h of consumption of good z by other households. The concavity of the 
function 
! 
"  reflects the basic need aspect of the external effects. The high degree 
of substitutability in the external benefits generated by households’ consumption 
of good z is reflected by the summation of external effects across households. The 
strict quasi-concavity of 
! 
u "( ) reflects the diminishing marginal returns to 
aggregate externalities. It is also assumed that no goods are inferior.  
 
Governments face the following fiscal situation.  
H6) Each locality determines a level of good z to be provided to each of its 
residents, i.e. z is treated as a local public good. In order to simplify the analysis 
of jurisdiction size, it is useful to leave aside diseconomies of scale in the 
provision of local public good.  
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H7) Localities and central government are assumed to have uniform lump-sum 
taxes at their disposal to finance their expenditures. Local public goods may 
therefore be paid with local taxes or with grants from the centre. The role of 
transfers in the analysis will be to affect the local provision of z, that generates 
spillover benefits for the rest of the society.  
H8) m denotes the share of local expenditures reimbursed by the centre through 
matching grants. The matching rate is assumed to be the same for all localities in 
order to simplify the analysis.  
H9) 
! 
gi  denotes any lump-sum grant from the centre to locality i, expressed in per-
capita terms. Note that the notation distinguishes lump-sum grant level by 
localities because the centre may use these transfers to intervene in the financing 
of local public good in a particular locality.  
H10) 
! 
c
i
 is the per-capita level of local “own-contributions” to the provision of the 
local public good in locality i. The level of local public good consumed by each 
resident of locality i is thus 
! 
zi = ci + gi  with lump-sum grants or 
! 
z
i
= c
i
(1"m)  
under matching grants.  
H11) The central government budget constraint, in summing total fiscal transfers 
across all localities i, takes the following form 
! 
ngi
i
" +G = NT  with lump sum 
grants and 
! 
m nz
i
i
" +G = NT  with matching grants, T denoting the amount of 
central government lump-sum tax imposed on each household.  
 
Consider those localities and households’ equilibria. 
H12) The equilibrium for locality i is assumed to solve the problem 
! 
max<xi ,zi > u xi,zi,(N " n)#(z ) + n#(zi),G( )  subject to H11 and assuming that 
! 
z  
denotes the per capita level of z provided to the residents of all localities other 
than i.  
H13) Given the strong assumption above, it is obvious that there is an unique 
! 
x
"
,z
"
,G
"( ) that maximises the common utility of all households subject to the 
fundamental resource constraint 
! 
x
h
h
" + zh
h
" +G # Nw . 
 - 47 - 
Interactions exist between the levels of government.  
H14) Localities take the parameters of the central government grant policies as 
given. The centre acts as a Stackelberg leader or first mover, with localities 
adapting as well as they can to the policies announced to them. However, the 
central government may not be able to enforce its commitment, as a departure 
from announced constraints seems to be a feature of soft budget constraint.  
 
According to those numerous and strong assumptions, the next section defines 
Wildasin’s bailouts model.  
 
4.2 Bailouts and externalities 
 
Externalities found the basic issue of this bailout model. Assume that the central 
government offers each locality a matching rate of 
! 
m
" for its expenditures on 
good z, which would support an efficient per capita level of z. Imagine that a 
locality fails to provide the basic good and sets 
! 
z
i
= 0. According to the 
externalities the provision of 
! 
z
i
 may engender for residents in other jurisdictions, 
the centre might intervene and control the provision of z for the locality i. The 
central government uses therefore its own resources in the interest of residents of 
other localities. In other words, the centre bails the locality i out. The strategic 
value is thus the level of basic good z provided by locality i, 
! 
z
i
. 
 
In order to simplify the relationship between the levels of government, it is 
sufficient to consider the interaction between a single locality i and the centre. 
Let’s suppose that the centre announces an optimal matching rate 
! 
m
" and that all 
other localities choose first-best levels of own-contributions to the provision of 
good z, 
! 
c
"
# (1$m
"
)z
" , thus achieving the optimal provision level 
! 
z
". Does 
locality i choose to set 
! 
c
i
= c
" and accept the central matching grant or choose 
some other level of its own contributions in anticipation of a central government 
bailout? The answer depends on the central government’s bailout policy, which 
describes what level of bailout a locality receives if it deviates from the first best 
contribution level 
! 
c
" . The decision of bailing out a locality i after observing its 
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choice of 
! 
c
i
 indicates that there is a sequential structure between levels of 
government. Wildasin therefore analyses the relationship recursively, considering 
first the central government’s bailout policy.  
 
4.2.1 Central government bailout policy 
The objective of the central government in Wildasin’s model is the maximisation 
of the welfare of households residing outside of the locality i that is being 
considered for a bailout. In order to model the central government’s bailout 
optimization problem, consider the following three assumptions. Firstly, the level 
of own-contributions chosen by locality i is denoted by 
! 
" c 
i
, which may or may not 
be equal to 
! 
c
" . Second, the central government has the possibility to intervene in 
locality i’s provision of good z after observing 
! 
" c 
i
by adding a conditional lump-
sum grant of 
! 
" g i to locality i’s own contribution, resulting in a level of provision 
denoted by 
! 
" z i = " c i + " g i . Thirdly, the centre adjusts its level of expenditures on 
good G after observing the choice of 
! 
" c 
i
to have available funds.  
Considering that 
! 
N " n  is the total number of households that reside in localities 
other than i, the central government’s bailout optimization problem can be 
explains as  
! 
max< " g i , " G > u x
#
,z
#
,(N $ n)%(z#) + n%
" c i
1$ m#
+ " g i
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ , " G 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
+   (1) 
subject to 
! 
n " g i + " G = NT # m
$
(N # n)z$ + n
" c i
1# m $
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
*    (2) 
The objective function in (1) is the utility of a representative household residing in 
any locality other than i. Using (2) to solve for 
! 
" G in terms of 
! 
" g i and substituting 
into the utility function in (1) reduces the problem to an unconstrained 
maximisation with respect 
! 
" g i . The first order condition 
! 
uz(")
uG (")
#
$ c i
1% m&
+ $ g i
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
, -1      (3) 
must hold as a strict equality if 
! 
" g i > 0, i.e., if there is effectively a bailout.  
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The values of 
! 
" g i and 
! 
" G that solve the bailout problem (1) depend on the level of 
locality i’s own contribution, 
! 
" c 
i
. Assume that this locality chooses its contribution 
at the first-best optimal level 
! 
" c 
i
= z
# . The first order condition (3) must hold as a 
strict inequality at a solution to (1), and by continuity, this inequality must hold 
for any 
! 
" c 
i
sufficiently close to 
! 
z
". In other words, a locality that chooses a level of 
own-contribution to provide z that is optimal or sufficiently close to optimal 
receives no bailout from the centre.  
Wildasin proposes then the possibility for localities to obtain a positive bailout 
from the centre. In fact, if a locality i sets 
! 
" c 
i
= 0  and therefore makes no 
contribution at all to provide the good z, the central government bails out the 
locality, according to  
! 
u
Z
x
"
,z
"
,(N # n)$(z") + n$(0),G*( )
u
G
x
"
,z
"
,(N # n)$(z") + n$(0),G"( )
% $ (0) >1
    (4) 
This implies that the centre chooses a positive bailout 
! 
" g i > 0 for all own-
contributions 
! 
" c 
i
sufficiently close to zero. Note that high values of 
! 
" # (0) and of 
! 
u
Z
(") u
G
(") increase the left-hand side of (4), indicating that a bailout is relatively 
attractive to the centre if the first units of z provided to a locality produce large 
external benefits.   
The first order condition (3) must hold as an equality for all values of 
! 
" c 
i
such that 
the bailout 
! 
" g i is positive. The bailout function derived as a matter of central 
government policy can be denoted as 
! 
" g i = #( " c i) such that 
! 
"
1
1" m#
< $ % ( $ c 
i
) < 0        (5) 
One can deduct from this general case that increases in own-contributions are 
partially but not completely offset by reductions in net transfers from the centre.  
 
To summarize this section, there is no central government bailout when own 
contributions of locality i fall in the interval 
! 
" c 
i
,z
#[ ], where 
! 
" c 
i
< z
#  This means that 
a locality that chooses a level of own-contribution that is optimal or sufficiently 
close to optimal does not receive a bailout. The critical value 
! 
" c 
i
will be strictly 
positive if the externalities associated with locality i’s provision of good z are 
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sufficiently strong that (4) holds. The bailout is thus a strictly positive and 
monotonically declining function of the own-contribution level for all values of 
! 
" c 
i
in the interval 
! 
0, " c 
i[ ]. In other words, a locality that chooses a level of own-
contribution sufficiently close to zero receives a bailout from the centre.  
 
4.2.2 Local government bailout policy 
A specific feature of Wildasin’s model of bailout remains the assumption that 
local governments also exhibit bailout policies. He argues that they control the 
level of own-contributions to the local public good and thus determine whether to 
trigger a bailout. The condition (4) determines whether locality i can induce a 
bailout from the centre and represents a necessary condition for this locality to 
face a soft budget constraint. However, this condition is not sufficient for a soft 
budget constraint, since the bailout may be sufficiently unattractive that locality i 
would always choose an own-consumption level greater than 
! 
" c 
i
. Let’s therefore 
analyse the local choice of own-consumption to local public goods. 
If locality i chooses 
! 
" c 
i
# " c 
i
, the central government does not bail it out. On the 
other side, if locality i chooses 
! 
" c 
i
< " c 
i
, it then receives a bailout, and the 
consumption bundle that its residents receive is defined by the relations 
! 
" x 
i
= w #T # " c 
i
       (6.1) 
! 
" z 
i
=
" c 
i
1# m$
+ %( " c 
i
)        (6.2) 
! 
" Z = N # n( )$(z%) + n$( " z i)       (6.3) 
! 
" G = NT # m$ N # n( )z$ + n
" c 
i
1# m$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* # n+( " c i)     (6.4) 
The utility of locality i in the event of a bailout is therefore 
! 
u " x 
i
, " z 
i
, " Z , " G ( ), each 
argument depending on 
! 
" c 
i
. Let 
! 
ˆ " c
i
denote the values derived from (6) when 
! 
" c 
i
= ˆ " c
i
. The first order condition for a maximum of 
! 
u " x 
i
, " z 
i
, " Z , " G ( ) with respect to 
! 
" c 
i
is 
! 
u
z
(")
u
x
(")
+ n
u
Z
(")
u
x
(")
# $ (")
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
1
1+m,
+ # - 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* + n
u
G
(")
u
x
(")
m
,
1+m,
+ # - 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* .1  (7) 
with strict equality if 
! 
ˆ " c
i
> 0 .  
 - 51 - 
The first order condition (7) requires localities to choose a level of own-
contributions that takes into account central matching grants, bailouts and their 
impact on the centre’s own public good provision level. The own-contribution 
level 
! 
ˆ " c
i
lies in the interval 
! 
0, " c 
i[ ] and is thus lower than the first-best optimum.  
The locality i’s choice to induce a bailout depends on its own preferences and on 
the external effects that its provision of good z generates for other localities. Both 
these effects determine the location of the critical point 
! 
" c 
i
, which define the level 
of own contributions sufficiently high to reduce the bailout to zero and determine 
as well the rest of the bailout function 
! 
"( # c 
i
). Assuming that residents have a very 
inelastic demand for good z, the lower level of provision attained under a bailout 
plan is likely to be unattractive and the locality will not induce a bailout. On the 
contrary if locality have an own-consumption of good z highly substitutable with 
other goods, the bailout is more likely. The external effects also affect the 
likelihood of bailout, as strong external effects are more likely to induce a bailout 
rather than small external ones. To summarize, the likelihood to induce a bailout 
depends on the local and external benefits generated by the provision of the local 
public good.  
 
4.3 Bailouts and jurisdictional size 
 
A key feature of Wildasin’s model clearly remains the size of localities and their 
impact on the central government’s bailout policy. The section above has assumed 
that all localities are of the same size, n. However, the author suggests that a 
bailout is more likely when locality are large in size, that is, related to the “Too 
big to fail” hypothesis presented in the first part of this paper. Let’s impose any 
additional structures to the model developed in the section above to verify this 
postulation.  
The comparison of two discretely different consumption bundles involving every 
argument of the utility function, 
! 
x
"
,z
"
,Z
"
,G
"( )  and 
! 
ˆ " x , ˆ " z , ˆ " Z , ˆ " G ( )  is the first step 
when a locality decides whether or not to induce a bailout. The second one is 
assessing the effect of jurisdictional size on bailouts amount to model the vector 
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! 
ˆ " x , ˆ " z , ˆ " Z , ˆ " G ( )  as a function of n. The last stage is determining whether 
! 
u ˆ " x , ˆ " z , ˆ " Z , ˆ " G ( ) is increasing or decreasing in n and finally comparing its value with 
! 
u x
"
,z
"
,Z
"
,G
"( ). 
This analysis includes implications of more specialized assumptions about 
preferences. The author firstly supposes that the utility function is additively 
separable in each argument and quasi-linear in G, that is 
! 
u(x,z.Z,G) " A(x) + B(z) + C(Z) +G    (8) 
There are implications for the quasi-linearity of G3, which induce that 
! 
" c i (1# m
$
) + " g i = " c i (1# m
$
) + %( " c i) = " c i  for all values of own-contributions 
! 
" c 
i
such that the centre is willing to bail out the locality. If household preferences 
satisfy (8), the quasi-linearity in G implies that they will choose either 
! 
" c 
i
= 0  or 
! 
" c 
i
= z
#  if  
! 
n < " A (w #T
$
)       (9) 
When (9) holds, the author assumes considerable simplification for the remainder 
of this section. Particularly, if a bailout occurs, (9) insures that 
! 
" c 
i
= 0 , that the 
level of bailout is therefore the unique value 
! 
"(0) = # c 
i
, and that the bailout is 
precisely the level of consumption of the local public good z that will be 
consumed by residents in the locality receiving the bailout, i.e. 
! 
ˆ " z
i
= " c 
i
= #(0) . 
Assuming that preferences satisfy (8), the unique bailout level 
! 
" c 
i
that the centre 
provides is determined by the first order condition (3), which now takes the form 
! 
" C (Z) " # ( " c 
i
) $1       (10) 
where 
! 
Z " N # n( )$(z%) + n$( & c i) = Z
% # n $(z%) #$( & c 
i
)( )   (11) 
This condition is satisfied as an equality if the bailout 
! 
" c 
i
is strictly positive, which 
will be true if and only if (4) holds, that is,  
! 
" C Z# $ n %(z#) $%(0)( )( ) " % (0) >1     (12) 
                                                
3 The quasi-linearity implies that 
! 
" # (c
i
'
) = $1 1$m%( )  whenever 
! 
" # (c
i
i
) > 0 . Let’s assume this 
implication as given, as its development goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
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For a given utility function satisfying (8) and for a given external benefit function 
! 
"(#), whether or not condition (4) holds depends only on the value of n. 
Particularly, since 
! 
dZ
dn
= " #(z$) "#(0)( ) < 0
      (13) 
and since 
! 
C(") is strictly concave in Z, it follows that there is a critical value of 
jurisdiction size, corresponding to 
! 
n " 0,N[ ] such that (12) does not hold for all 
! 
n " n  while it does for all 
! 
n > n . In other words, it exists a critical jurisdiction 
size 
! 
n  such that localities not larger than 
! 
n  receive no bailout from the central 
government, whereas localities larger than 
! 
n  do receive positive bailout, if they 
choose a zero level of own-contributions to good z. Moreover, using (10) to solve 
implicitly for 
! 
" c 
i
as a function of n, we have 
! 
d " c 
i
dn
=
n " " C (Z) " # ( " c 
i
)
n " " C (Z) " # ( " c 
i
)
2 + " C (Z) " " # ( " c 
i
)
#(z$) %#( " c 
i
)( ) > 0   for 
! 
n > n (14) 
This last equation means that the size of the bailout offered by the central 
government to a locality that makes zero own-contributions to local provision of 
good z is higher, the larger the locality. According to the suppositions of (8), 
larger localities can obtain larger bailouts from the centre than smaller ones, and 
small localities may not be able to extract any bailout from the central government 
at all. The reason is that the local good provided by larger localities generates a 
larger positive externality. However, the analysis does not take into account the 
utility payoff of the consumption bundle a locality attains under a bailout as 
compared to that attainable with first-best optimal own-contribution. Wildasin 
states that it is hardly obvious to declare whether bailouts raise or lower utility for 
a locality’s residents, or whether bailouts are more or less attractive to large 
localities than small ones. Despite this fact, one can affirm that localities of size 
! 
n " n  always choose a first-best optimal level of local contribution to good z, 
! 
" c 
i
= z
# , since they cannot obtain a bailout anyway.  
 
To prove the foundation of his assumptions, Wildasin illustrates his model with 
numerical calculations. The author chooses the functional forms and parameters in 
order to shed light on the working of the model rather than to simulate a real 
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economy4. Those numerical results primarily confirm (14), in other words that the 
bailout offered by the centre to a locality is larger, the larger the locality. 
Moreover, significantly small localities do not receive any bailout at all. In 
addition, the calculations reveal that the utility payoff in the event of a bailout is 
larger for larger localities, and that in some cases large localities find that utility is 
higher under a bailout than the first best optimum. The local government in that 
situation clearly faces a soft budget constraint in the sense explained above, that 
is, the central government does offer resources to the locality to finance the 
provision of the public good z if the locality fails to do so, and the locality prefers 
this outcome than the first-best optimal level.  
 
According to the parameters determined by Wildasin, the following conclusive 
results give a more precise idea about the jurisdiction size and its impact on 
bailout. For instance, localities that constitute at least 21 percent of the national 
population receive positive bailouts. If smaller localities choose not to provide z, 
they receive no bailout at all. Localities of size 
! 
n < 21 thus face hard budget 
constraints. However, note that this critical value of 
! 
n  depends on the importance 
of external effects: with a small value of 
! 
c
0
, 
! 
n  can even attain 34 whereas it can 
only be 7 with a large value of 
! 
c
0
. A locality that constitutes 41 percent or more 
of national population is better off under bailouts and thus faces a soft budget 
constraint. Under the same parameters, localities of sizes ranging between 21 and 
41 percent of the national population would receive bailouts if they do not choose 
to provide the local public good, but the bailout is sufficiently unattractive that 
they prefer not to induce it. Those localities face hard budget constraints. Note 
that external effects play an important role in the decision of bailout. Indeed, 
Wildasin shows that weak external effects not only imply that the number of 
localities that can obtain non-zero bailouts from the centre remains small, but also 
that the size of the bailouts they can obtain is relatively small, making thus 
bailouts unattractive.  
                                                
4 The values are 
! 
N =100, 
! 
w =10 , 
! 
x
"
= 7 , 
! 
z
"
=1, 
! 
G
"
= 2N = 200. At first-best optimum, 
70 percent of income is allocated to private good consumption, 20 percent to the national public 
good G and 10 % to the local public good z.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
The model exposed above includes strong assumptions that greatly simplify the 
notation and the formal analysis. Moreover, the calculations do not give results 
that can be generalized. However, they provide a concrete illustration of many 
features of Wildasin’s model and give an interesting view on budget constraints. 
For instance, the model explains that the occurrence of bailout partly depends on 
the willingness of the centre to offer it. Externalities generated by local public 
goods may make a central intervention attractive from the view point of the rest of 
the society, but there are also conditions under which the centre will not intervene 
and induces therefore a hard budget constraint. Moreover, this willingness also 
depends on the magnitude of the externalities associated with the provision of the 
local public good. The occurrence of bailouts not only depends on the central 
government‘s willingness to offer them, but also on the decision of localities to 
accept them. This interesting feature explains that the payoff of residents in the 
event of a bailout may be sufficiently unattractive that the locality does not choose 
to trigger the central government intervention. Finally, it is demonstrated that 
budget constraints tend to be softer for larger localities. In other words, incentives 
for a bailout can be especially strong when localities are considered “Too big to 
fail”. Wildasin interprets this result as an indication that problems of fiscal 
discipline arise not because there is too much decentralization, but because there 
is too little. According to this point of view, it makes sense to devolve fiscal 
authorities to smaller jurisdictions. Pisauro gives another formulation to this 
problem in writing “for a given population size, the bailout problem becomes less 
serious, the higher the number of localities” (Pisauro, 2001, p. 13). The “Too big 
to fail” hypothesis remains a central theory in the literature, since most of the 
paper concerning bailouts and soft budget constraint problem refers to Wildasin’s 
work. 
 
A recent example of this assumption is the mortgage crisis in the United States, 
which perfectly illustrates the “Too big to fail” hypothesis. Despite that “saving 
companies from their own mistakes was not supposed to be part of the 
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government's job description” for American politicians and economists, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s possible failure changed their minds. Indeed, the 
government offers a bailout to these mortgages companies, which own nearly half 
of the nation’s $12 trillion worth of home mortgages. The common pool problem 
was also debated, as the “taxpayers - who now are confronted with plunging 
house prices, a drop on Wall Street and soaring costs for food and fuel - will 
ultimately pay the costs”. However, “the United States cannot be allowed to 
collapse, just as Fannie and Freddie cannot be allowed to fail”. In fact, the failure 
of such companies would engender one of the biggest downturn in the United 
States since the Depression. The survival of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
therefore their bailout, remained the unique solution (Goodmann, 2008).  
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5. Related models 
 
This chapter proposes an overview of models related to bailouts and commitment 
problems. Goodspeed and Wildasin have developed models that corroborate 
explanations given in the first chapter. Their fundamental findings remain 
elementary in the literature, since a number of researchers still refer to their 
results. For instance, Facchini and Testa (2007) examine a model which have 
similarities with the jurisdictional size model of Wildasin. In addition, this chapter 
gives further information about researches on bailouts. Indeed, a macroeconomic 
model by Qian and Roland (1998) is presented, as it contains important 
conclusions on fiscal competition and monetary centralization. Subsequently, a 
modern model developed by Köthenbürger (2003) analyses tax competition in the 
presence of a lack of fiscal commitment. To conclude, the last section presents 
researches that imply additional developments on the soft budget constraint 
problem, with a theory of Akai and Sato (2005) and a dynamic model of 
Bordignon and Turati (2005).  
 
5.1 Jurisdiction size, regional inequality and bailouts 
 
A recent survey by Facchini and Testa (2007, p. 333-344) captures similarities 
with both models presented above. Indeed, their paper deals with a simple two-
period model of public good provision within a federation that includes borrowing 
and jurisdiction size issues. Moreover, the common pool problem is also treated, 
as well as the question of redistribution among states. These authors based their 
paper on the lessons from Brazil’s debt crisis in the mid 1990’s.  
 
5.1.1 Context and hypotheses 
Facchini and Testa propose a theoretical framework, in which heterogeneous 
states face incentives to borrow. In a two-period setting, they consider a federation 
of two states that differ in their population size. All residents are endowed with a 
constant per capita income and the income of the larger state exceeds the one of 
the small. The federal government provides a federal public good, as the states 
 - 58 - 
provide a local public good. A proportional tax revenue is levied on the residents 
to provide both goods. The total revenues are allocated between levels of 
government via a formula assigning to each of them a share that is equal to their 
share of the first best provision of public goods. It is noteworthy to mention that 
the grant can only be spent for the local public good’s provision. States have the 
opportunity to finance the first period provision of the local good by borrowing at 
the current interest rate. However, the entire debt must be repaid in the second 
period. Borrowing in the first period means thus a reduction of citizens’ private 
consumption in the second period, in order to repay the debt. A state that is not 
able to repay the outstanding debt will default, unless the federal government 
decides to bail it out. In case of bailout, additional taxes are needed to provide the 
required funds, since states do not reduce the provision of public goods to repay 
the debt (as the provision is given by the first best level determined by the 
formula). The budget constraint faced by a state that receives additional funds is 
soft. On the other hand, if the centre denies a bailout and that the state must 
reduce its residents’ private consumption to repay the debt, the budget constraint 
is hard. The default has a negative impact on the income of the insolvent state, 
and on that of the entire federation in case of a large state’s default. Indeed, these 
authors point out that the default of large Brazilian states in the mid-1990’s posed 
a serious threat to the financial stability of the whole country.  
 
The authors model the interaction between the centre and the states as a two-
period game. They firstly characterize the first best allocation of resources and 
then study under which conditions each state finds optimal to borrow to increase 
the local public good’s provision guaranteed by the revenue sharing formula.  
 
5.1.2 Findings and conclusion 
Facchini and Testa firstly determine the optimal amount of federal and local 
public good, which is provided according to the revenue sharing formula. They 
find that borrowing is never optimal, as the first best allocation is achieved when 
states do not borrow. However, the central government must be able to enforce a 
hard budget constraint, in order to avoid expectations of bailout by state 
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governments. When states anticipate that they will receive further funds from the 
central government, they will borrow in the first period and over-provide the local 
public good. The presence of a soft budget constraint may engender a common 
pool problem, as excessive borrowing is financed with tax levied on all the 
residents of the federation. However, Facchini and Testa assume that a bailout 
might be optimal ex-post as it would be too costly for the country to maintain a 
hard budget constraint. Indeed, a default involves a cost for the economy of the 
state and/or of the federation, and when this cost is significant, the total welfare of 
the federation in the second period may be higher if a bailout is offered. 
Nevertheless, states may anticipate that the “no bailout” policy is not credible and 
over-borrow in the first period.  
 
These authors propose an interesting viewpoint on bailouts and defaults, as they 
introduce the cost of default in their framework. They assume that the large state 
also has a negative impact on the income of the small state, while this is not the 
case for the small one. They find that it is optimal from a point of view of the 
large state and the federation to bailout the large state only. However, this bailout 
is not Pareto efficient and the default’s magnitude may change the results. In fact, 
the loss imposed on the small solvent state by the bailout of the large insolvent 
state might engender the default of the small state. As a consequence, a bailout 
occurs only when both states are insolvent. The authors explain that if the total 
debt cannot be bailed out, the small state will be forced to default, while the larger 
might face a soft budget constraint.  
 
Although the hard budget constraint is optimal from an ex-ante point of view, the 
ex-post incentives to bail a state out are different since the default is costly and its 
consequences vary depending on the size of states. States, whose default is 
detrimental for the federation, are more likely to receive a bailout. Anticipating 
the central government ex-post incentives, large states are more willing to borrow 
than small ones. This conclusion may be illustrated with the Brazilian experience, 
since the richest and most fiscally independent states run fiscal deficit and benefit 
from the federal largesse.  
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5.2 Fiscal competition and monetary centralization 
 
The first macroeconomic model of the soft budget constraint viewed as a dynamic 
commitment problem in the framework of a federal government was presented in 
a paper of Qian and Roland (1998, p. 1143-1162). These authors build a model 
based on China’s experience of transition to a market economy, in order to 
investigate fiscal competition and monetary centralization. They analyse how the 
government’s incentive to soften budget constraints depends on the extent of 
decentralization of fiscal and/or monetary authority. The description of their 
model’s basic framework is interesting, as it certainly influenced numerous 
papers.  
 
5.2.1 Context and hypotheses 
Qian and Roland build a model in a three-tier hierarchy with respectively the 
central government, multiple local governments and state and non-state 
enterprises. They firstly assume that government bodies face sequential bailout 
decisions in the presence of sunk costs and enterprises behave strategically in 
securing subsidies. Secondly, they hypothesize that local governments compete 
with each other in allocating their own budgets to attract mobile factors and grants 
from the central government in a simultaneous-move game. They finally assume 
that the central government plays a sequential game against local governments in 
deciding on the allocation of grants and, if monetary financing is possible, on the 
total money supply. Note that state-owned enterprises face soft budget constraints, 
as they are bailed out by the central government in case of financial trouble. In 
their model, the authors try to find what combination of fiscal and monetary 
conception would be more efficient.  
 
5.2.2 Findings and conclusion 
Qian and Roland establish interesting conclusions on the effect of federalism in 
hardening budget constraint. Their results indicate that local government 
supervision over state enterprises, as opposed to central one, has an impact on the 
enterprises’ budget constraints. In fact, decentralization of fiscal authority 
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together with mobility of non-state capital across regions is effective in hardening 
enterprises’ budget constraints. The authors show that fiscal competition may act 
as a “commitment device”. Indeed, the competition among local governments in 
attracting capital in their region creates an externality that increases the 
opportunity cost of subsidizing inefficient enterprises which in turn reduces the 
incentives for bailouts. They also demonstrate that fiscal competition together 
with monetary recentralization hardens enterprises’ budget constraint. Effectively, 
Qian and Roland explain that monetary decentralization remains inefficient with 
fiscal decentralization, as it creates high inflation and therefore softens budget 
constraints.  
 
5.3 Tax competition and bailouts 
 
Qian and Roland’s model proposed the first viewpoint on tax competition and its 
relation with bailouts. The wave towards globalization renders tax competition 
more prevalent and becomes a common subject for policy-makers and academics. 
Among dozen of researches, Köthenbürger (2003, p. 498-513) examines capital 
tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal 
commitment.  
 
5.3.1 Context and hypotheses 
Köthenbürger studies tax competition in a two-layer fiscal union with 
decentralized states. Those decentralized members engage in capital tax 
competition and receive lump-sum grants from the federal government. In this 
model, decentralization implies that states choose their tax policy in moving first 
and the federal government decides the amount of transfer after the level of public 
debt has been chosen. In moving so, state governments rationally anticipate 
federal transfers in case of fiscal profligacy and strategically select too high public 
debt levels.  
In his analysis, Köthenbürger compares the outcome prevailing under Nash 
equilibrium and the outcome established under decentralized leadership. In other 
words, the first outcome is obtained in assuming that both levels of government 
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choose their policy simultaneously, i.e. each government takes other 
governments’ policy choices as given. The result coincides with the standard tax 
competition outcome. The second outcome is achieved with states acting as 
Stackelberg leaders in a two-stage game between the two levels of government. In 
the first stage, states select their capital tax rate simultaneously, taking the 
reaction of the federal government and the capital demand into account. They 
behave as Nash-competitors towards each other. In the second stage, the federal 
level determines its policy variables for given states’ policy choices and 
anticipates the reaction of capital demand. The game is solved by backward 
induction, in order to characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium. The author 
finds that decentralized leadership neutralizes tax competition, i.e. capital mobility 
does not negatively affect public good provision. Nevertheless, interstate lump-
sum redistribution effectively becomes an interstate revenue-sharing system, 
which renders public good provision inefficiently low.  
 
5.3.2 Findings and conclusion 
Given symmetric states and the local public good under-provision in both 
situations, Köthenbürger compares the welfare obtained using each scenario. He 
finds that the effect of revenue-sharing under decentralized leadership with an 
infinite number of states unambiguously implies lower welfare relative to tax 
competition. However, decentralized leadership may prove to be welfare superior 
with a finite number of states. Also in this paper, the author provides another 
result on vertical fiscal externalities. He explains that under decentralized 
leadership, state tax policy affects other states budgets via federal policy changes. 
Köthenburger shows that states anticipate that lump-sum transfers equate public 
funds ex-post, namely after capital taxes have been chosen. Identifying the federal 
decision-making problem, states perceive transfers as depending on tax rates, 
which convert lump-sum transfers into conditional transfers from each state’s 
perspective. This expectation of grants has two consequences on taxing 
incentives. First, it neutralizes fiscal externalities arising with capital mobility. 
Ex-post equalization implies that the outflow of capital, following an increase in 
the tax rate and the induced tax base expansion in neighbouring states, feeds back 
 - 63 - 
in the form of higher transfers to the tax-raising state. In other words, fixing 
capital tax rates prior to federal transfers undermines horizontal fiscal externalities 
due to capital mobility among states. The lack of commitment implies that each 
state therefore perceives its tax base as immobile, a phenomenon which 
strengthens taxing incentives. Second, the author shows that tax competition may 
appear to be the preferred federal governance structure, as the federal intervention 
in the presence of fiscal externalities is more welfare-deteriorating.  
 
5.4 Additional developments 
 
Soft budget constraint problem remains a current topic, since authors still develop 
new theories. This section offers two types of models that imply additional 
developments to the subject. The first model presented below results from Akai 
and Sato (2005)’s researches and synthesizes two different views on the soft 
budget constraints. The second shows implications of a dynamic model with 
incomplete information, as formulated by Bordingnon and Turati (2005). 
 
5.4.1 Decentralized leadership meets soft budget 
Akai and Sato (2005, p. 1-58) put forward a new theory on the soft budget 
constraint problem. They first state that there are two different kinds of literature 
on the commitment problem. Indeed, they insist on a difference between the soft 
budget and the decentralized leadership literature. The former postulates that the 
ex ante moral hazard or adverse incentive consequences on the local governments 
result from the anticipation of the ex post bailing out by the central government in 
the pursuit of ex post objectives. Goodspeed and Wildasin’s models belong to this 
category, as they conceptualize a sequential game with local governments moving 
first and the central government deciding the transfer policy in the second turn. 
The latter addresses ex ante horizontal and reciprocal externalities with the central 
government acting as Stackelberg follower and local governments as leaders, but 
establishes different implications from the soft budget constraint problem. Indeed, 
this type of model achieves an efficient allocation of local public services when 
there are inter-regional spillovers. Then, ex post transfers serve to internalize the 
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spillover effect, the transfers being lump-sum ex post but perceived as matching 
by the regions ex ante. Köthenburger’s model which is presented in the section 
above belongs to this literature. Akai and Sato aim to synthesize the decentralized 
leadership and the soft budget views in order to develop a new model of 
commitment problem.  
 
In fact, these authors develop a simple decentralized leadership model in which 
local governments move first and the transfer scheme is decided ex post. In both 
literatures, the central government pursues ex post social welfare politics that 
distort the ex ante incentives of local governments. Akai and Sato want to 
establish the direction of the ex ante distortion that addresses commitment 
problem. In other words, they analyse what local governments’ decision on public 
expenditures or tax collection is made ex ante. The timeline is therefore very 
important in their model, as the ex ante local government’s choice between 
expenditures and tax collection affects the policy instruments determined ex post. 
Indeed, the central government acts as a Stackelberg follower and designs its 
intergovernmental transfers according to the local government’s decisions. The 
authors intend to study how the timing structure affects the equilibrium 
consequences. In order to examine the efficiency of their model, Akai and Sato 
consider extensions, such as changing scenarios or introducing tax competition.  
 
They establish that the direction of the ex ante distortion relies on what policy 
instrument is decided ex ante at the local level, namely tax revenue raising effort 
or local spending. This means that whatever extensions the authors tried, the 
essence of the incentive problem remains the same. Indeed, the ex post discretion 
of intergovernmental transfers still gives the following output: the ex ante 
competition results with under-taxation, while the horizontal interaction with 
expenditures competition result with local governments over-spending. Moreover, 
they explain that the lack of central government commitment to own transfer 
policy leads to inefficiency, either under taxation or over-spending relative to the 
first best or the commitment solution.  
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5.4.2 Dynamic model with incomplete information 
Bordignon and Turati (2005, p. 1-54) suggest the development of a dynamic 
model and give new interesting ideas to analyse the soft budget constraint 
problem. They primarily investigate the case of health care funding in Italy, since 
this country has plenty of examples of ex post interventions by the central 
government to finance regions’ health deficits. Their model is closely related to 
bailout’s expectations of public health expenditures in Italy.  
 
The confrontation between the centre and regional governments on the matter of 
health was a strategic game in Italy. Regions claimed that the central government 
under-finances them for the provision of health services, whereas the centre 
affirmed that regions overspend and waste money. However, in the middle of the 
90’s, the central government decided to implement measures, reducing ex ante 
health funding and convincing regions it was going to be “tough”. Facts such as a 
dramatic financial crisis and the need to meet Maastricht constraints for joining 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) made the hard budget constraint credible. 
Regions then successfully introduced measures to control expenditures. However, 
health expenditures started to accelerate again when Italy obtained its final stage 
for the EMU.  
 
The model is implicitly inspired by the facts above. Bordignon and Turati 
consider a simple model with two governments, the central and the regional. The 
centre moves first in setting the health funding level, for simplicity a low or a high 
level. Then the regional government moves and selects an expenditure level, low 
or high too. They assume that if the region responds with the appropriate level of 
expenditures to the central funding, region’s budget is in equilibrium. Moreover, 
if the central government sets a high funding, the region can only respond with a 
high level of services. However, if the centre sets a low level of funding, the 
region may choose a high level of expenditures. The central government must 
then decide to let the region fends for itself with the deficit or bail it out partly or 
fully.  
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The authors explain that under perfect information, the only perfect equilibria of 
the game are (1) central government plays the low funding in the first period and 
the region selects the low expenditures level; (2) the central government selects a 
high level of funding and the region immediately chooses the high spending; (3) 
the centre plays the low funding, the region reacts by selecting a high level of 
services. The central government bails the deficit out in the third period. The first 
best equilibrium can only be achieved if the centre can credibly commit to a no 
bailout policy, namely the case (1).  
 
Bordignon and Turati include the dynamic view of the model at this step, 
according to the Italian experience. They suppose that the region only has some a 
priori on the central government’s policy. In other words, the region does not 
know exactly the centre’s decision and expects therefore that it will be “tough” 
with a probability p, and weak with probability 
! 
1" p. The “tough” central 
government prefers not to bail out the region, while the “weak” central 
government bails out the region in case of deficit. Then the authors solve the 
dynamic game using the situation of incomplete information.  
 
Their conclusion leads to an interesting implication: under incomplete 
information, the “weak” government can try to take advantage of region’s 
uncertainty by mimicking the “tough” behaviour. Region may then believe this 
illusion and responds with a low level of expenditures and therefore reach the first 
best equilibrium (1). The “weak” government can thus achieve this equilibrium, 
whereas this would be impossible under perfect information. Then the result of 
this game depends on the ex ante credibility of the centre to induce a no bailout 
policy, that is the value of p. Indeed, when p is sufficiently high, a low level of 
financing is a more reliable signal that the central government is “tough” and the 
region therefore reacts by choosing a low level of funding. On the other hand, this 
situation would not be possible with perfect information since the region would 
not believe the implicit threat and thus select a high level of expenditures.  
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The dynamic model of Bordignon and Turati implies interesting suggestions in 
the soft budget literature. Indeed, the assumption of incomplete information gives 
the opportunity to the central government to take advantage of regions’ 
uncertainty. With a sufficiently high value of p, the centre can behave as a 
“tough” government that implements hard budget constraints.  
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III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT IN 
TRANSITION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The second part presented the way to model soft budget constraint mechanisms. 
The last part of this thesis aims to introduce empirical studies on the soft budget 
constraint problem in transition and developing countries. It exists a limited 
number of papers concerning transition and developing countries, as most of 
empirical evidences were tested in developed countries. In the literature, famous 
researchers such as Von Hagen (1991) or Poterba (1995) tested hypotheses for 
United States. Studies by Rodden (2000) about Germany, Borge and Rattso 
(2002) concerning Norway and Dahlberg and Von Hagen (2004) on Sweden also 
examined the phenomenon in Northern European countries. Another paper by 
Garcia-Mila, Goodspeed and Mc Guire (2001) presented results about Spain.  
However there are some empirical papers on transition and developing countries, 
with a particular interest for Latin America. The sixth chapter presents empirical 
studies, which specifically analyse the impact of politics on fiscal performance 
and intergovernmental transfers. Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000) present 
first an empirical study based on the analysis of Argentinean provinces, which 
provides results on political interest and the common pool problem. The second 
section provides the findings of Abdul Jalil (2007) about political influence on 
spending in Malaysia. Finally, Kraemer (1997) investigates the equity principle, 
incentives principle and political non-discrimination principle in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. The seventh chapter lays out an empirical survey concerning the 
“Too big to fail” hypothesis. Trillo, Cayeros and Gonzales (2002) test the impact 
of Mexican sub-national governments’ size when a bailout occurs. The last 
chapter principally deals with borrowing autonomy, as Rodden (2002) tries to test 
its simultaneous application with intergovernmental transfers and federalism.  
 
The presentation of empirical surveys will always follow the same layout. The 
first section presents the hypotheses tested and the second one the results. The last 
section concludes the chapter with a summary and sometimes comparison with 
other studies or comments.  
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6. Political influence on fiscal performance and intergovernmental 
transfers 
 
As mentioned in the first part of this thesis, many transition and developing 
countries face problems in their decentralization process. Despite the devolution 
of expenditures responsibilities, a number of sub-national governments remain 
transfer dependant. A vertical fiscal imbalance is the result of such a distortion 
between sub-national expenditures and revenues. This soft budget constraint’s 
origin affects most of Latin American countries. In addition, the lack of clarity in 
the grants’ distribution or the discretion of certain types of transfers may foster the 
influence of politics and institutions on spending. Annual grants negotiation or 
spending behaviour modification softens therefore sub-national budget 
constraints. The following three studies try to give empirical evidence of political 
influence in Latin America and Malaysia.  
 
6.1 Politics, institutions and fiscal performance in Argentina 
 
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000, p. 305-333) carry out a survey that 
provides results on institutional characteristics and fiscal politics. In founding 
their investigation on Argentina, these authors focus on the interaction between 
fiscal authorities, as most provincial spending is financed from taxes collected by 
the national government. Primarily, it is important to explain their approach in 
detail in order to understand their reasoning and results. The key players of the 
game are politicians interested in providing net benefits to their region. According 
to the large fiscal imbalance in Argentina, these benefits are financed out of a 
common pool, that is, an over-utilization of the national wealth. The authors 
postulate that there is a common pool at two levels because of the federal fiscal 
organisation in Argentina. On the one hand, the federal transfers induce an over-
spending bias across jurisdictions, as each province tries to overuse the national 
common source of funds. On the other, local legislators see the provincial and 
national taxing capacity as a common resource too. In their survey, the authors 
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test hypotheses about institutional and political variables in order to show their 
impact on the common pool problem.  
In their approach Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi choose the spending as 
independent variable. As other authors, they explain the soft budget constraint 
problem in using the spending variable. This implies the following link: sub-
national entities that still have increasing spending without the corresponding 
revenues rise their vertical fiscal imbalance. As in the case of Argentina, indebted 
provinces receive more intergovernmental transfers to cover their expenditures or, 
in last resort, demand a bailout. Extraordinary transfers or bailout are financed by 
all the taxpayers, hence the relationship with the common pool problem.  
 
6.1.1 Hypotheses 
The following three hypotheses are derived from the common pool problem 
across provinces, that is, when each province tries to overuse the national wealth.  
 
The Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement (FTSA) is a transfer mechanism that 
implements the distribution and destination of revenues collected by the federal 
government. Most of the transfers that provinces receive are determined by this 
regulation, which is based on a coefficient fixed by law and independent of actual 
actions. However, this can lead to inefficient spending since governments receive 
the full benefit of increased provincial spending, while paying only a part of the 
political tax cost. The authors hypothesize that, holding other factors constant, 
spending will be greater in the provinces that are more favoured by the FTSA.  
H1) Provinces that receive a larger percentage (normalized by population) of 
transfers under the FTSA will have a higher per capita spending.  
 
The President, who is elected by a national constituency, is held responsible for 
macroeconomic outcomes and has thus better incentives for fiscal conservatism 
than governors. According to the Argentina’s high party discipline, provincial 
governors from the President’s political party will behave close to the national 
objectives. In fact, the President is able to induce governors from his party to 
internalize a portion of externality to a greater extent than opposition governors. 
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The authors expect, ceteris paribus, lower spending in provinces where the 
governor is from the same party as the President.  
H2) Provinces where the governor is from the same political party as the 
President will have lower per capita spending that provinces where the governor 
is a member of the opposition.  
 
The third hypothesis postulates that party affiliation may influence the outcome. 
In Argentina, the Peronist Party (PJ) and the Radical Civic Union (UCR) are large 
parties that share the same fiscal and economic ideologies.  
H3) Provinces headed by Peronist and Radical governors do not differ noticeably 
in their levels of per capita spending.  
 
The next hypotheses are derived from the application of the common pool 
problem at the provincial level, that is, when local legislators see the provincial 
and national taxing capacity as a common resource.  
 
According to political economy theory, fiscal discipline is greater under divided 
than unified government as there are less difficulties for the executive to get the 
budget through the legislature. This hypothesis also follows the party discipline 
logic emphasized in H2. In fact, the authors assess that a unified government 
tends to help their governor in his fiscal prudence politic.  
H4) Provinces where there is divided government will have higher per capita 
spending than provinces where there is unified government.  
 
Another fiscal determination commonly accepted by political economists is the 
influence of the electoral cycle. The authors suggest that during election years, 
governors employ public work projects and other expenditures to affect the 
upcoming election.  
H5) Provincial spending per capita will be higher in gubernatorial election years 
than in other years.  
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The authors construct an index composed of six individual indicators related to 
budgetary institutions and linked procedures, in order to assess their impact on the 
fiscal outcomes. The components used to form those indicators concern the ability 
of the legislature to amend the budget proposal submitted by the governor, the 
provincial borrowing ability, the municipal borrowing ability, autonomy and 
strength of audit agency, provincial-municipal tax sharing agreements and finally 
promotional subsidies in the Constitution. They attribute a value from zero to ten 
to each province and sum the six indicators in order to create the Fiscal 
Institutionalization Index. Higher the value, more disciplined the province.  
H6) Per capita spending will be lower in provinces with higher values on the 
Fiscal Institutionalization Index.  
 
6.1.2 Method and variables 
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi apply a system of simultaneous equations, linear 
three stage least squares (3SLS) as methodology to analyze the determinants of 
provincial revenue and expenditures in the Argentinean provinces.  
 
Three stage least squares (3SLS) is a method developed by Zellner and Theil in 
1962. It combines multivariate regression and two stage least squares. Three stage 
least squares estimates are obtained by first estimating a set of linear or non-linear 
equations with cross-equation constraints imposed, but with a diagonal covariance 
matrix of the disturbances across equations. The parameter estimates obtained are 
used to form a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbances, 
which is then used as a weighting matrix when the model is re-estimated to obtain 
new values of the parameters. Three stage least squares estimates are consistent 
and asymptotically normal, and under some conditions, asymptotically more 
efficient than single equation estimates (Zellner, Theil, 1962, p. 54-55).  
 
The data used are a pooled cross-section of the 23 Argentine provinces from 1985 
to 1996, excluding years that contain bias. The analysis begins with an 
examination of hypotheses H2-H5, using the 3SLS method and the data set. 
Authors then utilize the results to test hypotheses H1 and H6 by regressing the 
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time in-variant Fiscal Institutionalization Index on the 23 provincial fixed effects 
variables drawn from the 3SLS analysis.  
 
The dependant variables in the 3SLS analysis are the annual per capita revenue in 
the province (revenue per capita) and the annual per capita public sector spending 
in the province, excluding interest payment (expenditure per capita). The 
expenditures contain the following control variables: provincial revenue per 
capita, national transfers (amount of transfers per capita received by the province 
from the national government during the year) and unemployment (percentage of 
the work force that was unemployed in the province’s capital during the year). 
The revenue have revenue per capita at (T-1) and energy consumption as 
independent variables. Actually, energy consumption is a proxy for provincial 
GDP, for which reliable annual data are unavailable. For purposes of control, 
cross sectional (i.e. provincial, 23 total) and temporal (i.e. year, 10 total) fixed 
effects variables are also included.  
 
To test the hypotheses H2-H5, the authors observe the effect of five political 
variables on the level of per capita provincial public sector spending. The 
variables president party measures the partisanship of the governor in relation to 
that of the president. The years during which the governor of a province holds to 
the same party as the president are coded one, while other years are coded zero. 
The following variables assess the partisan affiliation of the governor. For the 
variable UCR governor, a one is given if the province was governed by a member 
of the UCR during the year being coded. For the variable provincial party 
governor, a one is assigned if the province was governed by a provincial party. 
The fourth variable is divided government, which is defined as a situation in 
which the governor’s party lacks a majority of the seats in the single house in the 
unicameral system and in both houses in the bicameral system. Years where 
divided government existed are coded one while other years with unified 
government receive zero. The last variable is governor election year and years in 
which gubernatorial election occurred are coded with one, zero otherwise. 
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Table 3: A 3SLS analysis of the institutional determinants of provincial per 
capita revenue and expenditure  
Depdt 
variable 
Indpdt 
variable R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
Revenue 
per 
capita 
Rev.pc at 
(T-1) 
0.933**
* 
(0.028) 
0.486**
* 
(0.056) 
0.479*** 
(0.056) 
0.478*** 
(0.056) 
 
0.478*** 
(0.056) 
0.475*** 
(0.056) 
0.460*** 
(0.059) 
 Energy Cons. 
1.268 
(1.549) 
8.786 
(11.284
) 
12.636 
(11.384) 
13.088 
(11.393) 
13.132 
(11.594) 
14.983 
(11.664) 
9.497 
(11.862) 
 
Cross-
sectional 
fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Temp 
fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No Yes 
 Adjusted R2 0.821 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 
Exp  
per 
capita 
Prov 
revenue 
per 
capita 
1.027**
* 
(0.085) 
1.741**
* 
(0.315) 
1.750*** 
(0.309) 
1.726*** 
(0.313) 
1.677*** 
(0.299) 
1.628*** 
(0.293) 
0.918** 
(0.304) 
 National Transfer 
1.093**
* 
(0.019) 
0.834**
* 
(0.044) 
0.818*** 
(0.044) 
0.819*** 
(0.044) 
0.810*** 
(0.043) 
0.802*** 
(0.043) 
0.813*** 
(0.046) 
 Unempl 2.485 (1.848) 
-0.285 
(2.115) 
0.081 
(2.075) 
-0.405 
(2.113) 
-0.161 
(2.111) 
0.301 
(2.077) 
-2.899 
(2.753) 
 President party   
-
42.280*** 
(14.275) 
-
48.270*** 
(15.160) 
-
49.701*** 
(14.975) 
-
60.023*** 
(15.099) 
-
58.253*** 
(16.446) 
 Divided Govnmt    
-19.742 
(18.472) 
-17.079 
(18.278) 
-15.043 
(18.215) 
-20.605 
(17.437) 
 
Governor 
election 
year 
    32.976
** 
(13.236) 
33.225** 
(12.986)  
 UCR Governor      
30.294 
(23.118) 
33.685 
(22.991) 
 
Prov 
party 
governor 
     -82.135
** 
(30.957) 
-88.541** 
(29.040) 
 
Cross 
sectional 
fixed 
effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Temp 
fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No Yes 
 Adjusted R2 0.955 0.959 0.960 0.960 0.962 0.963 0.973 
Source : Jones, Sanguinetti, Tommasi (2000), p. 320 
Note: the standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 0.05 level for a one-tailed test; ** 
significant at the 0.01 level for a one-tailed test; *** significant at the 0.001 level for a one-tailed 
test.  
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6.1.3 Results 
The analysis of the determinants of per capita public sector revenues and 
expenditures in the Argentine provinces between 1985 and 1996 provides the 
following results.  
 
a) There is a strong support for H2, as the President’s party has a strong and 
significant inverse effect on the level of per capita provincial spending. On 
average, provinces with a governor member of the President’s political 
party spend significantly less than provinces with a governor of the 
opposition. In other words, the authors’ view is supported since governors 
who are co-partisans of the President spend less than other governors. It is 
noteworthy that this result is closely related to the strong party discipline 
in Argentina. For instance, the study of Abdul Jalil about Malaysia will 
show different conclusions.  
 
b) The findings also support H3 and permit concluding that “party matters”5 
in Argentina. Two factors underling this “party matters” in that country 
are the existence of a common pool and the President’s status as the leader 
of a relatively disciplined political party and his ensuing additional 
influence over governors who are co-partisans. Conversely, ideological 
differences do not influence taxing and spending preferences in Argentina, 
as it normally happens in developed countries.  
 
c) The results do not provide support for H4. Actually, the presence of a 
divided government fails to lead to a significant increase in per capita 
spending. On the contrary, the negative estimated coefficients show that a 
divided government may reduce spending, albeit not at a significant level. 
 
d) The findings provide support for H5, since levels of provincial per capita 
spending are significantly greater when gubernatorial elections years 
occur. Authors find that provinces spend on average 33 pesos per capita 
                                                
5 In the literature, « party matters » is used to explain the influence of parties in taxing and 
spending preferences.  
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more during gubernatorial than during non-gubernatorial years. Indeed, 
governors try enhancing their chances of re-election via public works and 
salary bonuses for provincial public sector employees.  
 
In order to confirm the robustness of their results, Jones, Sanguinetti and 
Tommasi conduct two diagnostic tests. They first take into account the effect of 
national transfers on the level of provincial spending. The second diagnosis 
concerns the economic changes faced by Argentina between 1985 and 1996, 
namely macroeconomic policies’ modification and the reduction of inflation 
through the implementation of the Convertibility Plan. Neither the influence of 
national transfers nor the historical facts related to the Convertibility Plan affects 
the conclusions on H2 to H5. The robustness of their findings is therefore 
confirmed.  
 
Finally, the authors examine H1 and H6 in regressing the invariant normalized 
FTSA shares and Fiscal Institutionalization Index values on an estimated 
coefficient for the provincial fixed effects variables. The findings of this analysis 
confirm H1, since the larger the normalized FTSA share received by average 
province, the higher its level of per capita spending. Furthermore, these results 
support the confidence in H6, as the Fiscal Institutionalization Index has a 
significant inverse effect. That is, the greater the level of fiscal institutionalization 
in a province, the lower its level of per capita spending is likely to be.  
 
6.1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the political and institutional factors that influence the 
fiscal outcomes. Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi base their empirical survey on 
Argentina, since this federal country possesses interesting characteristics. The 
empirical results give interesting views on the political features that bias the tax 
and spending decisions. Provinces where the governor is from the same political 
party as the President, ceteris paribus, spend less than the other provinces. Party 
discipline plays therefore a positive role in strengthening provincial expenditures. 
The authors achieve yet another interesting result about the electoral expenditures 
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cycle, as provincial spending is higher in gubernatorial election years than in other 
years. Provinces with unified governments do not appear as a good predictor for 
fiscal outcomes. Indeed, the authors find that a divided government may reduce 
spending, although not at a significant level. This survey also shows that more 
fiscally conservative provinces spend less than other provinces. However, a main 
effect remains: the fact that the Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement induces a bias to 
overspend, especially in provinces that are more favoured by the system. There is 
thus the temptation to affirm that the FTSA is not a good system since it increases 
the common pool problem. Argentina faces a high vertical imbalance problem, 
since transfers on average account for 77 percent of provincial spending. This 
origin of soft budget constraint, combined to the FTSA and the political influence 
represent a great distortion of fiscal discipline. This chapter will show other 
results that confirm the important fiscal problems faced by this Latin American 
country. The next empirical study proposes another view on intergovernmental 
relations by investigating the politics and spending behaviour in Malaysia.  
 
6.2 Influence of political representation and ideologies on spending in 
Malaysia 
 
Abdul Jalil (2007, p. 117-175) founds his survey on the relationship between 
political systems and economic performance. He effectively tries to test whether 
highly represented states in the government or states that share the same political 
ideology as the central government influence the outcome. His reasoning is as 
follows: a state that is influential faces weaker incentives to be fiscally 
responsible, has a higher probability in obtaining extra allocations from the 
central government and may expect a bailout in case of fiscal crisis. As in the 
previous survey, this author also uses spending to explain the soft budget 
constraint problem.  
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6.2.1 Hypotheses 
The author bases his hypotheses on two different models that may explain the 
possible relationship between politics and spending.  
 
The first hypothesis is based on the legislative bargaining model, which induces 
the two following assumptions. It first supposes that the state representatives 
care about the outcome of their constituencies and face therefore incentives to 
reward them in attracting public sponsored projects. Secondly, it assumes that the 
state representatives have the capacity to influence central government’s 
decisions, especially in the allocation of public projects. 
H1) States with the strongest representation in the Parliament or in the 
Government have a relatively higher spending. 
 
The second hypothesis follows the conclusion of the partisanship model, which 
postulates that ideological preferences of sub-national governments may partly 
explain the amount of transfers that they will receive from the central government.  
This amount will in turn determine the sub-national government’s level of 
expenditures. This assumption has the opposite reasoning than the second 
hypothesis of Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi. Indeed this latter postulated a high 
party discipline, whereas the following hypothesis states that the partisanship 
allows higher spending.  
H2) States that share the same political ideologies as the central government have 
relatively a higher spending. 
 
6.2.2 Method and variables 
Abdul Jalil applies the generalized method of moments (GMM) to test the link 
between politics and spending. 
 
 - 79 - 
Generalized method of moments (GMM) is a method developed by Hansen in 
1982. This development revolutionized empirical work in macroeconomics and 
became an important unifying framework for inference in economics, as it 
encompasses most of common estimation methods. Hansen “centres on the 
presence of known functions, labelled moments functions of observable random 
variables and unknown parameters that have expectations zero when evaluated at 
the true parameter values”. The method generalizes “the standard method of 
moments where expectations of known functions of observable random variables 
are equal to known functions of the unknown parameters” (Imbens, 2002, p. 493). 
 
There are two types of GMM estimators, namely the difference estimator and the 
system estimator. The data used cover the period of 1982 to 2002, divided into 
four periods which are concordant with the term of the Parliament’s members. 
The data on state governments’ expenditures and revenues are obtained from the 
State Finance and the political, socio-demographic, as well as economic data from 
other sources such as election reports or the major newspaper.  
 
To test H1, the author uses the number of seats per capita allocated to each states 
in the parliament and the number of members per capita a particular state has in 
the cabinet as variables. The first variable represents the influence that a particular 
state has in the Parliament, as the more seats a state has the more influence it will 
have in the legislative process. Identically, the state that is overrepresented in the 
cabinet will have more influence on the decisions made at the executive level.  
To test H2, the author uses the number of seats per capita in the Parliament won 
by the ruling party, the percentage of state assembly seats won by the ruling party 
and the number of votes obtained by the ruling party as variables. Indeed, the 
author assesses that the extent of the partisanship of a state with the ruling party 
can be measured by the number of seats and votes obtained by the ruling party 
both at the national and state level elections.  The control variables include lagged 
value of the dependant variable, log of real per capita revenue, dummy variable 
representing year before election was held, GDP per capita, a dummy variable for 
states with petrol revenues, proportion of forest area, proportion of Malays and 
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natives in the total population, urbanization rate and the proportion of population 
with tertiary education. The table below shows the tests for the first hypothesis 
H1. The GMM difference is used in columns A to C and the GMM system 
estimator in column D to F.  
 
Table 4: The effects of over-representation in the legislative and in the 
executive on state governments’ expenditures  
 A B C D E F 
Poltical 
variables       
Seats in Parl. 
pc 
0.0025 
(0.0432)  
-0.0041 
(0.0325) 
0.0123 
(0.0081)  
-0.0022 
(0.0065) 
Member of 
cabinet pc  
16.4225*** 
(4.7758) 
16.5420*** 
(4.77597)  
9.7423*** 
(2.1120) 
10.5827*** 
(3.5703) 
Economic 
variables       
Revenue 0.5516
*** 
(0.1044) 
0.5232*** 
(0,1259) 
0.5799*** 
(0.1245) 
0.7857*** 
(0.1319) 
0.7072*** 
(0.1326) 
0.7028*** 
(0.1151) 
Lagged exp -0.0308 (0.1284) 
-0.0416 
(0.1219) 
-0.0479 
(0.1427) 
0.2362*** 
(0.0725) 
0.2393*** 
(0.0686) 
0.2451*** 
(0.0684) 
GDP pc 0.0001 (0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Socio-demo 
variables       
Malays prop -0.0667 (0.0462) 
-0.0487 
(0.0472) 
-0.0465 
(0.04215) 
0.0026 
(0.0019) 
0.0017** 
(0.0009) 
0.0016 
(0.0009) 
Urban rate 0.0045 (0.0073) 
0.0124** 
(0.0055) 
0.0063 
(0.0051) 
0.0033 
(0.0023) 
0.0011 
(0.0022) 
0.0008 
(0.0020) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.0213 
(0.0256) 
0.0041 
(0.0157) 
0.0208 
(0.0173) 
-0.0062 
(0.0109) 
0.0005 
(0.0087) 
-0.0007 
(0.0105) 
Size 0.8786 (0.6939) 
0.6279 
(0.5477) 
0.6204 
(0.5512) 
0.0161 
(0.0234) 
-0.0018 
(0.0215) 
-0.0057 
(0.0235) 
Population -0.1098 (0.5978) 
-0.6822 
(0.5822) 
-0.6742 
(0.5824) 
-0.1409 
(0.0858) 
0.0915 
(0.0446) 
0.1257 
(0.0982) 
Constant    0.2341 (0.3376) 
0.1997 
(0.1535) 
0.2509 
(0.2663) 
Hansen p-
value 0.306 0.267 0.275 0.862 0.573 0.719 
1st order AC 
(prob) 
-2.67 
(0.008) 
-2.99 
(0.003) 
-2.74 
(0.006) 
-2.78 
(0.0050) 
-2.51 
(0.012) 
-2.43 
(0.015) 
2nd order AC 
(prob) 
1.12 
(0.261) 
-1.40 
(0.163) 
-1.41 
(0.159) 
1.12 
(0.261) 
-0.81 
(0.415) 
-0.89 
(0.371) 
Source: Abdul Jalil (2007), p. 157 
Note: the standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 0.1 level; **significant at 0.05 level; 
***significant at 0.01 level. 
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6.2.3 Results 
The analysis of the impact of political factors on the spending tested by Adbul 
Jalil between 1982 and 2002 provides the results listed in the table 4.  
 
a) With the number of seats in the Parliament as primary independent 
variable, the impact of overrepresentation at the Parliament level on the 
expenditure level is not statistically significant (column A). The value 
indicates that a higher number of representatives per capita at the 
legislature do not translate into a higher spending by the state 
governments. This finding is consolidated since the author obtains the 
same result with the GMM system estimator (column D). 
 
b) In the column B and E, the author tests the number of members in the 
cabinet per capita as primary independent variable. The table shows that 
the coefficient is highly significant in both the GMM system and the 
GMM difference estimator. This suggests that a higher representation in 
the executive leads to a higher spending by state government. In the 
column C and F, the author introduces simultaneously both variables in 
the estimation and finds the same results as the previous analysis.  
 
c) In order to test the effect of political ideologies on state government 
spending, the author introduces in his estimations the three variables first 
separately and then simultaneously. Still in using the GMM difference and 
the GMM system estimator, none of the three variables are statistically 
significant. This finding implies that political ideologies do not seem to 
have an impact on the state government’s fiscal behaviour.  
 
6.2.4 Conclusion 
Abdul Jalil finds interesting results about the impact of legislative and executive 
representatives on state government’s fiscal behaviour. In regards to these 
findings, he can conclude that what matters the most for the states in order to be 
influential is to be well represented at the executive level of government. An 
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overrepresentation at the legislative level does not have a significant impact on the 
state government’s fiscal outcomes. A possible explanation should be the minimal 
role played by the members of the Malaysian Parliament in the decision process. 
Moreover, he finds that the political ideologies do not influence the state 
governments’ spending either.  
 
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi’s second hypothesis has similarities with the 
second hypothesis of Abdul Jalil. Indeed, they both postulate that partisanship 
may influence the fiscal outcome of sub-national governments. The first survey 
assumes that sub-national governments with a governor of the same political party 
as the President spend less, whereas the second survey supposes higher spending 
if the states share the same ideological preferences as the centre. The empirical 
analyses give different results, since the first survey assesses that governors who 
are co-partisans of the President spend less than other governors while the second 
study does not notice any impact. The following remarks may explain the 
difference between both surveys. The President’s status in Argentina hardens the 
party discipline and this partisanship permits to avoid spending differences. This 
argument is supported by the third hypothesis, since the authors find that “party 
matters” in Argentina. On the other hand, the same political party is in place since 
the Independence in Malaysia. As a (possible) result, being from the same party as 
the central government does not seem to play a significant role on the fiscal 
behaviour.  
 
One may therefore consider each political system and characteristics of each 
country in analysing the political impact on spending. Features such as party 
discipline, term of office or even historical events might influence the results of 
such empirical surveys. The next study proposes an interesting comparison of 
Latin American countries, in dealing with equity principle, incentive principle and 
political non-discrimination.  
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6.3 Nature of intergovernmental transfers in Latin America 
 
Kraemer (1997, p. 1-47) did an empirical paper concerning transfers and politics 
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Vertical fiscal imbalance remains a major problem for Latin America countries, as 
mentioned in the first part of this thesis. Intergovernmental transfers thus 
represent a main source of revenue for sub-national entities. Are those transfers 
influenced by political factors? This author tries to investigate whether the 
transfers system works according to rational principles, i.e. how funds that are 
transferred from the central to the intermediate governments are distributed 
among the latter.  
 
6.3.1 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are based on three principles in order to measure the rationality of the 
transfers system: equity principle, incentive principle and political non-
discrimination principle. 
 
Equity principle: redistributive policies, closely related to the living conditions, 
should distribute more per capita transfers into regions with poor socio-economic 
indicators. The author gives a weak and a strong interpretation of this principle: 
the weaker demands only that poorer region should not receive less funds than 
richer ones. The stronger demands that, ceteris paribus, governments of poor 
regions should not only receive at least the same per capita transfers but should 
actually obtain relatively higher funding, in order to foster equalization of living 
conditions across the nation. 
 
Incentive principle: perverse incentives, due to systematic transfers to states with 
fragile fiscal positions, can discourage tax effort. Indeed, states that expect bailout 
transfers from the centre do not have incentives to raise their tax effort. Once 
again, the author postulates two interpretations. The weak assumption is that the 
per capita transfers from the central government should, other things being equal, 
not increase the lower tax ratios of the intermediate government. The strong 
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assumption demands that the central government should create incentives for 
higher tax efforts, and per capita transfers should decrease with lower tax ratios of 
intermediate governments. The main goal aims to lessen the importance of 
transfers in sub-national governments’ budget.  
 
Political non-discrimination principle: this proposition assumes that electoral, 
partisan or other political constellations should play absolutely no role in the 
determination of transfers’ distribution. Indeed, the author thinks that political 
influence is not compatible with a rational and fair system of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations.  
 
6.3.2 Method and variables 
The author uses the same empirical approach for the three countries, namely a 
multiple regressions using OLS estimation. The study of Brazil is developed to 
explain how the author proceeds and to give the interpretation of the results. For 
the two following countries, only the basic information is given since the 
development stays identical from one empirical survey to another.  
 
Brazil: the author chooses the year of 1991, as it is considered a normal year since 
there was no political transition. Data forms a sample of 27 Brazilian states. 
Variables are standardized and have a cross-provincial arithmetic mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of unity. As both dependant and independent variables 
are defined in this way, the regression coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity. 
Indeed, the coefficients display the change in the dependant variable if the 
independent variable is exogenously increased by one standard deviation.  
 
Table 5 presents the determinants of the regional distribution of federal transfers 
per voter to state governments in Brazil. The first dependent variable is total 
transfer, which is the standardized amount of transfers per capita (equation B1). 
Tax transfer describes the constitutionally mandated tax sharing mechanisms 
(equation B2) and non-tax transfer the more flexible transfers from other 
agreements (equation B3). The first independent variables is tax effort which is 
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the standardized ratio of the states’ own revenue and their respective GNP. PCY 
(per capita income) is also considered, since it is used as the indicator to 
determine the amount of transfer resources to the states for redistributive 
purposes. Senadores is a variable that defines the number of senators per million 
voters and is used to isolate the difference of representation of states. Bahia is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the chairman of the budget committee assures 
favourable transfers for his home state of Bahia, and zero otherwise. Alagoas is an 
additional variable that control the President home state, as the latter case of 
Bahia. The third dummy, Sao Paulo, controls the “metropolis-bias” in favour of 
the most populous, politically and economically most influential state.  
 
Equation B1 shows that there is a perverse effect indicating that better-off states 
received, other things being equal, higher transfers. A coefficient > 0 effectively 
indicates that the equity principle was violated in 1991. Equation B3 demonstrates 
that a more distributional pattern exists for the discretionary non-tax part with a 
highly significant elasticity of 0.27. On the contrary, formula based-transfers seem 
to be negatively dependent from PCY (equation B2). Tax effort shows no 
significant coefficient in any of the three equations. Thus, the prevailing transfers 
system does not create any incentives in favour of enhanced own revenue 
collection on the state level (i.e. a positive sign) but also avoids moral hazard 
problem (i.e. a negative sign). Moreover, there is evidence that neither the 
chairman of the budget committee nor the President favour their home states of 
Bahia or Alagoas. Insignificant results are also reported for the dummy Sao Paulo 
and there is therefore no detection of “metropolis-bias”. The most significant and 
striking result in those equations remains the Senadores variable. Indeed, the 
findings clearly indicate that the Senate influences the distribution of federal 
transfers to the states.  
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Table 5: The determinants of the regional distribution of federal transfers 
per voter to state governments in Brazil  
 B1 B2 B3 
Dependent 
variable 
Total transfer 
(per voter, 1991) 
Tax transfer 
(per voter, 1991) 
Non-tax transfer 
(per voter, 1991) 
PCY 0.16 
(3.05) 
-0.15 
(-1.46) 
0.27 
(3.69) 
Tax effort -0.03 
(-0.61) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.03 
(-0.53) 
Senadores 1.00 
(22.16) 
0.87 
(9.84) 
0.99 
(15.59) 
Alagoas 0.04 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(-0.07) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
Bahia 0.09 
(0.38) 
-0.15 
(-0.34) 
0.17 
(0.55) 
Sao Paulo -0.31 
(-1.25) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.43 
(-1.24) 
R2 adj. 0.90 0.76 0.86 
F-value 84.4 19.4 41.3 
Sample size 27 27 27 
Source : Kraemer (1997), p. 42. 
Note: the values in parentheses are t-statistics. The coefficients in bold are significant at a level of 
90 percent or more. All F-value are above the critical value.  
 
Argentina: the author chooses two distinct years (1986 and 1995), representing 
different stages of the Argentinean process of democratisation. Data forms a 
sample of 23 provinces, excluding a province that could create a bias. Variables 
are also standardized and have a cross-provincial arithmetic mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of unity. The first dependent variable is total transfer, which 
represents the per capita transfer of all funds from the federal to the provincial 
government. The second is automatic transfer, which comprises only the formula-
based segments of transferred funds per capita, while ATN transfer represents the 
completely discretionary Treasury Grants. As independent variables, the author 
selects an index of human development , the density, tax effort and two political 
variables to control parties’ influence and finally the Senadores. Moreover 
dummies are also used to control the President home state’s grants.  
 
Mexico: Kraemer chooses the year of 1992, which is the middle of a presidential 
term of office. The dependent variable still is transfer and all variables are 
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standardized with a mean of zero and a standard variation of unity. As 
independent variables, the author takes an index of human development, tax effort, 
Senadores, political variables to control parties’ influence and representation, and 
dummies to control favourable treatment for President home state. 
 
6.3.3 Results 
Results are classified per country with the findings corresponding to each of the 
three principles.  
 
a) Brazil: the equity principle was violated in the year examined, as states 
with higher per capita income received, other things being equal, higher 
per capita transfers. The incentive principle was strongly violated, but 
held in the weak formulation. In fact, tax effort played no role in the 
determination of the grants distribution. And while higher tax efforts on 
sub-national level were not encouraged, they were at least not influenced 
negatively. Finally, the political non-discrimination principle was 
violated. Over-representation of population-poor states in Brazil attained 
impressive differences. For instance, Sao Paulo can send only 0.16 
Senators per million voters whereas Roraima can send 41, that is 256 
times more.  
 
b) Argentina: both equity and incentive principles hold in their respective 
weak interpretation in both years considered. Indeed, the payments are 
unrelated to the level of both provincial development and revenue raising 
efforts. However, both principles were violated in using the strong 
interpretation: no positive relationship exists between development and tax 
effort on one hand and transfer receipts on the other. One might deduct 
that the present intergovernmental fiscal system cannot contribute to the 
expansion of less developed regions of Argentina. The political non-
discriminatory principle was violated in both years. Firstly, discretionary 
transfers are prone to be politically manipulated. For instance, President 
Menem’s home province received much more ATN grants, which are 
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discretionary and non-reimbursable. The high coefficient and its 
significance of La Rioja variable (home province of Menem) prove this 
conclusion. Moreover, even the rules-based revenue sharing systems are 
not immune to the political interest. The author assesses that the 
differences in representation in Senat had strong repercussions on the per-
capita allocation of non-discretionary transfers. On the other hand, it can 
be stated that partisan interest did not significantly determine the 
distribution of transfers.  
 
c) Mexico: the equity principle has been violated in its weak and its strong 
interpretations in 1992. Indeed, less developed states systematically 
received less per capita transfers than richer ones. The coefficient of a rich 
state tested in the survey shows that it constantly received by far the most 
per capita transfers.  The incentive principle in its weak interpretation has 
been satisfied in both years, that is, increased tax effort by states was not 
punished by a withdrawal of transfers.  The political non-discrimination 
principle has been violated in Mexico in several ways. There are 
indications that fiscal transfers system was used by the Government to 
promote the ruling parties electoral perspectives. In fact, states that 
support the ruling parties during presidential election received, other 
things being equal, more per capita funds. Secondly, the author finds that 
certain states receive substantial grants in period of gubernatorial election. 
Indeed, the government is more generous with states, in order to 
synchronize the budget cycle with the electoral calendar. In this way, the 
ruling party improves the short-term economic conditions and insures 
success at the polls. Finally, population-poor states which are over-
represented in the Senat receive more funds per capita. This last political 
distortion is exactly the same problem that Kraemer detects in the 
Argentina’s situation. The author deduces that the distribution of funds is 
therefore “supply-leading” rather than “demand-following”. To conclude 
the findings concerning Mexico, and also to contrast with the Argentinean 
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case, the results do not show any influence of the Mexican President in the 
attribution of additional grants for his home state.  
 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
Kramer attempts to show the effects of political institutions on the distribution of 
intergovernmental transfers. His investigation gives interesting but worrying 
results, as the rational principles were violated in most of the cases. The violation 
of the equity principle in Brazil, Mexico and in Argentina (in the stronger 
formulation only) reinforces disparities between poor and rich regions. This 
renders the equalization of living conditions across the nation practically 
impossible. Furthermore richer states receive relatively more transfers, although 
they already have enough resources. This fact may exacerbate the risk of soft 
budget constraint, since richer states know they will still receive 
intergovernmental transfers despite their “rich-state” status.  
 
The second principle holds in its weak interpretation in the three cases, but not in 
its stronger formulation. The next step for those countries is therefore to intensify 
decentralization and subsidiarity in order to gradually shrink the importance of 
transfers in the sub-national governments’ budgets. This step will not only give 
sub-national governments more flexibility but will especially harden budget 
constraint, since less transfers diminish the risk of bailout’s expectation.  
 
The systematic violation of the last principle, namely the political non-
discrimination principle, tends to prove the great importance of this factor of 
distortion in Latin America. Indeed, Kraemer declares that political institutions 
have proved to be of equal or even higher importance as economic and socio-
demographic factors in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. Although each country has 
its own typical political problems, over-representation of poor-population states in 
the Senat remains an important common problem in this survey. Indeed, states or 
provinces can usually send two Senators irrespective of the number of residents, 
and this creates a bias in favour of less populous states. In fact, they have the 
possibility to influence the distribution of discretionary transfers, and even rule 
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based grants in certain situations. In the parameters tested for Mexico, Kraemer 
finds that states receive more grants in period of gubernatorial elections. This 
result can be linked with the higher spending in electoral cycle tested by Jones, 
Sanguinetti and Tommasi. In both situations, one may deduct that political parties 
try to misrepresent the reality to voters, in order to gain more votes. In case of 
fiscal profligacy, voters can believe that sub-national governments are not held 
accountable and this may lead to demand of bailout.  
 
To conclude this section, one can affirm that political institutions play a major 
role in the softness of sub-national budget constraints as they use different means 
to influence the distribution of intergovernmental transfers. To lessen this effect, 
countries of Latin American have to reduce the discretionary power in their 
budgetary procedure and/or have to decree binding rules for fiscal policies.  
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7. Is the “Too big to fail hypothesis” valid in Mexico? 
 
The banking literature stated the proof that size matters when it comes to bailing 
out an entity. As explained in the first part of this paper and demonstrated in the 
second, the “Too big to fail” hypothesis is an important factor to explain the 
bailout of large sub-national states or provinces. This chapter aims to show 
empirical results about this origin of soft budget constraint, in order to prove that 
large sub-national governments may expect a bailout because of their size.  
Trillo, Cayeros and Gonzales (2002, p. 365-380) found their empirical survey on 
the case of Mexico, as this Latin American country has interesting characteristics. 
Indeed, this Federation faced the 1995 financial crisis, the so-called Tequila crisis, 
and thus coped with highly indebted local governments. The federal government 
offered a generalized bailout in order to rescue its sub-national entities. The 
author’s aim is to evaluate questions behind bailouts to prevent futures ones. This 
chapter only focuses on their analysis of sub-national government’s size as 
determinant of bailout.  
 
7.1 Hypotheses 
 
First of all, these authors consider two types of bailouts. The first is the open 
bailout (or generalized bailout), which took place as a result of the Tequila crisis 
when the Federation had to rescue virtually all the states. In a second example, 
they identify hidden bailouts, which could be situations where a state with a 
primary fiscal deficit also reports a reduction in its debt level. In other words, 
hidden bailouts may be described by the definition given in the introduction of 
this thesis. The authors analyse separately both types of bailout in their empirical 
study.  
 
The first hypothesis tests the size of sub-national governments in the 
determination of the bailout’s amount after the Tequila crisis.  
H1: Does the size of a state matter in the generalized bailout? 
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The second hypothesis tests the size of sub-national governments in the case of 
hidden bailouts.  
H2: Does the size of a state matter in hidden bailouts? 
 
7.2 Method and variables 
 
Trillo, Cayeros and Gonzales use a regression to test the “Too big to fail” 
hypothesis in both types of bailouts. Their data source is the Secretaria de 
Hacienda which is the Finance Ministry of Mexico. The period of this study 
covers the years between 1994 and 1998. 
 
To test H1, the dependant variable is the generalized bailout measured as 
Extraordinary transfers from the federal government to the state as proportion of 
its total revenue. In their econometric test, the authors include proxies for the size 
of the states, as the importance of the states is not an observable variable. They 
first use Number of formal workers in the state, since they may exert political 
pressure in the form of strikes. Secondly they include Population, as a highly 
populated state has a greater impact at the polls. The higher are these variables, 
the greater are the chances for the large states to be bailed out.  
 
To test H2, the authors define two dependent variables, each one representing a 
possible definition of a hidden bailout. Debt reduction that is unmatched by fiscal 
state government surpluses represents the first dependent variable. In fact, a 
hidden bailout may be indicated when a sub-national government presents a fiscal 
deficit but still reduces its level of outstanding debt. Variation in the interest rate, 
which reflects the difference in interest rates before and after debt renegotiation is 
the second dependent variable. As independent variable, the authors still use 
Number of formal workers in the state.  
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Table 6: Influence of sub-national governments’ size in the determination of 
the bailout amount after the Tequila crisis 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Dpdt variable: Extraordinary 
transfers (1994)    
Population 0.016560 0.003946 4.20 
R2 0.41   
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.243713   
    
Dpdt variable : extraordinary 
transfers (1998)    
Number of formal workers in 
state 0.252027 0.045973 5.48 
R2 0.40   
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.035954   
Source: Trillo, Cayeros, Gonzales (2002), p. 373. Adapted by the author.  
 
Table 7: Influence of sub-national governments’ size in the case of a hidden 
bailout 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Dpdt variable: Debt reduction    
Number of formal workers in the 
state 769432.2 347572.7 2.21 
R2 0.6   
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.142152   
    
Dpdt variable: Variation in 
interest rate    
Number of formal workers in the 
state 2.48E-13 7.82E-14 3.17 
R2 0.06   
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.171915   
Source: Trillo, Cayeros, Gonzales (2002), p. 378. Adapted by the author.  
 
7.3 Results 
 
a) The results of the regression in the table 6 suggest that H1 holds. 
Effectively, the sign of the coefficient Number of formal workers in the 
state is positive and statistically significant at the standard significance 
level. Furthermore, the coefficient Population remains positive and 
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statistically significant too. This means that the size measured in these 
terms matters when the Federation decided by how much to bail a state 
out. 
b) The results of the regression in the table 7 indicate that the “Too big to 
fail” hypothesis holds, regardless of the definition the authors give to a 
hidden bailout. Indeed both coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The survey of Trillo, Cayeros and Gonzales suggest that the bailouts in Mexico 
took two forms, namely a generalized bailout and a hidden one. Among others 
hypotheses, they test the “Too big to fail” assumption. Their findings show that 
the size of states turned out to be important in explaining bailouts, regardless of 
the definition they used. These results confirm the facts described in the first part 
of this paper and also Wildasin’s model. In fact, it can be validated that Latin 
American countries may bail large states out as they are politically significant. In 
this study, the size is represented with the number of formal workers or the 
population in a state. However, from an economic point of view, states that 
possess high GDP should not face a financial crisis, since this may lead to a loss 
of confidence among foreign investors in the whole country. The size of a state 
could therefore be assessed with an economic measure too. In their study, these 
authors also test the importance of the GDP per capita and find that bailouts have 
a regressive distributional effect. In other words, the richer states receive more 
extraordinary funds. Those results correspond to Wildasin’s suppositions. His 
model effectively confirms that larger localities can obtain larger bailouts.  
 
The “Too big to fail” hypothesis has therefore strong support. It is described in the 
literature as the origin of soft budget constraint, is then modelled by a famous 
author and is confirmed with empirical evidence.  
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8. Borrowing autonomy and fiscal discipline in OECD, transition 
and developing countries 
 
As revealed in the first part of this thesis, borrowing may soften sub-national 
budget constraint in certain situations. Unrestricted legislation or poorly defined 
restrictions effectively engenders large deficits and therefore expectations of 
bailout by sub-national governments, creditors and voters. Rodden (2002, p. 670-
687) assesses that large deficits occur when sub-national governments are 
simultaneously dependant on intergovernmental transfers and are free to borrow. 
Moreover, he argues that this combination is frequently found in federations or 
constituent units. This author tests borrowing autonomy with vertical fiscal 
imbalance and commitment.  
 
8.1 Hypotheses 
 
Countries that face high levels of vertical fiscal imbalance need to find a credible 
no bailout commitment. To harden their sub-national entities’ budget constraint, 
central government can formally restrict their spending and access to credit. 
Indeed, this easy way of restriction seems to be a direct response to commitment 
problems.  
H1: Central governments will place restrictions on sub-national borrowing 
autonomy when fiscal imbalance is high.  
 
In the second hypothesis, the author postulates an interactive relationship between 
intergovernmental transfers, borrowing autonomy and fiscal performance. 
Assuming that vertical fiscal imbalance is associated with sub-national fiscal 
indiscipline, the relationship should only hold when sub-national governments 
have relatively unrestricted access to borrowing.  
H2: Vertical fiscal imbalance will only affect sub-national fiscal performance at 
high levels of borrowing autonomy.  
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Federalism implies a limited autonomy of the central government. Indeed, the 
federated units (i.e. the sub-national governments of a federation) have some 
influence in the formulation of the constitutional contract and can therefore enact 
rules or constraints that limit the central autonomy.  
H3: Political federalism undermines the central government’s ability to restrict 
sub-national borrowing.  
 
8.2 Method and variables 
 
The author first uses a cross-section average and then a time-series cross analysis 
to test the hypotheses. The data are composed of yearly observations for forty-
three countries drawn from a cross-section of OECD, developing and transition 
countries for the period between 1986 and 1996.  
 
Rodden chooses the sub-national fiscal discipline as the dependent variable. He 
defines it as the sub-national surplus as a share of expenditures, since he finds 
that this variable should be the most appropriate to facilitate cross-national and 
time-series comparison. In order to minimize the impact of economic cycles, he 
utilizes averages over a sufficiently long time period and he also includes control 
variables for exogenous macroeconomic fluctuations. For the independent 
variable, the author measures vertical fiscal imbalance with the relation 
grants/revenue, as this distinguishes intergovernmental grants from own-source 
revenue. Rodden uses a slightly modified version of a legal institution index 
created by the Inter-American Development Bank as the independent variable for 
borrowing autonomy. A dummy codes federal countries because of their 
constitutional status of states or provinces. Moreover, the author includes several 
control variables that can influence central governments’ credibility to maintain a 
hard budget constraint.  
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8.3 Results 
 
a) There is support for H1, as the central government attempts to cut off sub-
national access to credit markets when vertical fiscal imbalance attains 
high levels. In this way, the centre prevents over-borrowing and therefore 
moral hazard problems.  
 
b) H2 holds, as relatively free sub-national entities that are simultaneously 
transfer dependent run larger long-term deficits. The results effectively 
show that strict formal borrowing limitations or relative fiscal 
independence leads to relatively less deficits among sub-national 
governments. The author also stipulates that growing transfer dependence 
over time is associated with larger deficits only when sub-national entities 
are free to borrow. The borrowing autonomy represents therefore an 
objective origin of soft budget constraint, as it clearly exacerbates the 
deficit level of transfer-dependent entities.  
 
c) The cross-section model states that federated sub-national governments 
have significantly higher levels of borrowing autonomy. H3 thus holds, 
since federated units have a greater access to credit.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
Many developing and transition countries have rapidly decentralized 
responsibilities without giving the corresponding funding. Indeed, this 
responsibility often accrues to the central government which then distributes 
revenues via a transfers system. The simultaneous increase of transfer-dependence 
and sub-national borrowing autonomy do not give incentives to enlarge the local 
tax base. Sub-national governments run therefore large amounts of deficits (H2) 
and may finally demand a bailout. To prevent this, certain central governments cut 
off access to credits (H1). Brazil and India introduced this type of restrictions in 
order to enhance the control of sub-national spending and borrowing. However, 
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Rodden finds that this method takes place in small and homogeneous unitary 
system rather than in large federations. Closely related to this author’s remark, H3 
assesses that federated sub-national governments have a greater borrowing 
autonomy. According to this empirical study, federated units have a larger access 
to credit markets and less restrictions in case of fiscal indiscipline. Furthermore, 
Rodden specifies that asymmetry of jurisdictions size or small overrepresented 
jurisdictions generally characterize federations. This empirical part treats both 
problems with particularly significant results. In fact, the survey on Mexico shows 
that the size matters in the bailout decision and Kraemer demonstrates that the 
problem of overrepresentation occurs in Latin America.  
 
Consequently does federalism lead to moral hazard problems? The different 
empirical evidences may throw doubts on the positive aspects of this political 
system for transition and developing countries. On the other hand, there is 
considerable indication that fiscal discipline works well among governments like 
the US states or Swiss Cantons. Therefore, there is temptation to conclude that the 
goal is to increase the local self-sufficiency. Indeed, the central government must 
send a clear signal to voters and creditors that it pursues a no-bailout policy. 
Rodden proposes for instance to increase the tax base and revenue raising capacity 
and to place borrowing restrictions. However, he is aware that this can be 
extremely difficult in poor countries with weak or corrupt local government 
institutions and high levels of inequality.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis proposes an overview of the soft budget constraint problem in 
transition and developing countries. The first chapter describes five origins that 
underlie the expectation of receiving additional funds from the central 
government. The synthesis sets out the importance of vertical fiscal imbalance 
and political influence in the softness of budget constraint. This tendency is 
confirmed in the empirical part. Table 1 reveals that interaction between 
mechanisms favours fiscal indiscipline, rather than one unique origin’s influence. 
Furthermore, authors even state that countries such as Ukraine face a systemic 
failure, that is, the existence of bad incentives for fiscal discipline in almost every 
realm. The second chapter presents mechanisms used in countries of the case 
study literature to harden their sub-national government’s budget constraints. 
Despite the implementation of various restrictions, central governments do not or 
only partially succeed in their reforms. However, South Africa’s case shows that 
only a systemic policy approach provides correct incentives. Conversely “what 
works best in one country may not in another because of the different fiscal, 
political and financial institutions in place”(Vigneault, 2003, p. 24). Nevertheless, 
the best way to reform tends toward the sovereignty of sub-national entities with 
increase of the tax base and revenue-raising capacity, implementation of 
borrowing restrictions and a clear signal to voters and creditors that the centre 
pursues a no bailout policy. Despite the attractiveness of such local self-
sufficiency, its application in poor countries facing weak or corrupt local 
government institutions and high level of inequality can be extremely difficult 
(Rodden, 2002, p. 684). Moreover, timeline is an important factor in the 
improvement of budget constraint’s hardness, since the establishment of fiscal 
discipline takes time, especially in transition and developing countries. 
 
The factual part gives the flavour of the phenomenon, while the second provides 
details on technical aspects. Indeed, models of soft budget constraint focus on 
specific cases and try to demonstrate implications of the commitment problem. 
Chapters three and four contain famous models that constitute the basic literature 
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on soft budget constraint problems. Goodspeed (2002) develops a model on 
equalization transfers, whereas Wildasin (1997) deals with externalities and 
jurisdiction size. Their models represent a basic framework for other researchers, 
such as Breuillé, Madiès and Tagourdeau (2006) or Facchini and Testa (2007) 
among others. A new wave of models based on the decentralized leadership 
literature give interesting additional developments. Indeed, Köthenbürger (2003) 
or Akai and Sato (2005) develop models that differ from the basic setup and 
suggest extensions such as tax competition in the presence of bailouts.  
 
The last part of this thesis aims to introduce empirical studies on the soft budget 
constraint problem in transition and developing countries. Several hypotheses test 
political influence and results give relevance to this soft budget constraint’s 
origin. For instance, Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000) show that electoral 
cycles affect expenditures in Argentina, while Abdul Jalil (2007) supports that 
Malaysian states which are well represented at the executive level of government 
have relatively higher spending. In both studies, authors assume that political 
influence on spending may then generate expectations of bailout in case of fiscal 
recklessness and thus soften sub-national budget constraint. Moreover, Kraemer 
(1997) presents worrying results on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers 
in Latin America. Among other results, he proves that the overrepresentation of 
less populous states distorts the distribution of discretionary transfers. The famous 
“Too big to fail” assumption finds relevance in a study on Mexico by Trillo, 
Cayeros and Gonzales (2002), since size turned out to be an important factor in 
explaining the bailouts. Finally, Rodden (2002) proposes an interesting test on 
borrowing, since he demonstrates that sub-national governments run large deficits 
when transfer dependence is coupled with free access to borrow.  
Most of empirical works study countries of Latin America. It is regrettable that 
there is a lack of studies on other countries, such as countries of the former Soviet 
Union, as the factual part describes mechanisms of softness in such countries. 
Moreover studies on European Transition countries may be useful to follow their 
evolution, in order to assess their level of convergence with countries of the 
European Union.  
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As described in the first chapter and demonstrated in the empirical part, the soft 
budget constraint problem is real and not only a theoretical artefact. Indeed, rapid 
decentralization gives local governments more autonomy and discretion within 
their jurisdictions and this weaken central government authority. (Akai, Sato, 
2005, p. 51). The commitment problem that results from such a situation may 
induce dramatic consequences, either in macroeconomic or in social fields. The 
softness of budget constraints incurs high costs for a nation, especially in 
transition and developing countries. Indeed, the bailout of sub-national 
governments through the common pool resource do not seem to be a fair 
redistributive politic. Resources of all taxpayers may be used for equalization 
principles or funding of national goods, instead of granting sub-national 
government’s fiscal indiscipline. Institutional tools, such as rules or laws 
presented in the second chapter, may prevent central governments from bailout 
demands.  
 
However, implementation of hard budget constraint with institutional 
mechanisms, and even the respect of central pre-commitment not to bail out sub-
national governments, may be an inefficient choice. A recent paper explains that, 
in the context of a model of fiscal federalism, hard budget constraints do not 
necessarily solve soft budget constraints’ problems. In fact, Besfamille and 
Lockwood (2007) affirm that a hard budget constraint policy may lead to under-
investment. They assume the provision of good investment projects which 
generate non-monetary benefits greater than the initial cost, and bad investment 
projects that generate no benefit unless additional funding is invested. They also 
suppose that sub-national governments have incentives to lower the likelihood to 
provide bad projects in exerting, at a cost, efforts. Under hard budget constraint, 
sub-national governments may therefore be “over-incited” to provide efforts, as 
the payoff for bad projects is low. In such case, the hard budget constraint leads to 
under-investment, that is, under-provision of public goods. Indeed, sub-national 
governments do not want to provide a bad project and exert inefficiently high 
efforts. The authors find robust results and assess that, under some circumstances, 
hard budget constraint is not the most efficient policy.  
 - 102 - 
Despite this last argument’s relevance, the first step for transition and developing 
countries remains the establishment of hard budget constraint policies adapted to 
their situation. As already mentioned, the benchmarking of successful situations is 
not a miracle cure. However, fights against corruption and “friendly”6 
governments seem to be primordial in order to avoid distortions. The organisation 
of intergovernmental relations, especially assigning to lower levels of government 
the revenue bases they can collect, limiting the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
and reducing the degree of discretion in intergovernmental transfers, is also a key 
solution to reduce sub-national expectations of bailouts (Stein, 1998, p. 21). 
According to the facts and the studies described in this thesis, drastic measures are 
needed to get out of political habits and solve vertical fiscal imbalance problems.  
 
Future research should analyse the evolution of the soft budget constraint problem 
in countries of the case studies. For instance, it could be interesting to assess the 
efficiency of hard budget constraint mechanisms. The second chapter gave means 
to lessen bailout expectations. Therefore, it would be relevant to investigate their 
application over a long time period.  
                                                
6 This expression is used by Bordignon and Turati  (2005) to explain the political influence of 
regions well represented in the central government in Italy.  
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